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STATE OF IDAHO 
Knipe land Company, an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
VS. _____________________ and 
Rich~rd A. Robertson and Johnnie L. 
Robertson, husband and wife; and 
Robertson Kennels Inc.!. and Idaho Corporat'on 
Defendant/Respondents, 
VS. 
John Knipe, an individual, __ -=~~ ____________ aM 
ThirdP~rty Defe~dant/ 
Appell ~nt. 
Appealed from the District Court of the _T.!--'hc:...1!..!· r....::d=--____ _ 
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and 
for _--,-P a::...y<...:e:;...t:....:t:..,::e,---.-_ County 
H~tephen W. Drescher District Judge 
Mark GeSIno 
Attorney __ for AppeUant_ 
Robert Wetherell 
Attorney_ for RespoMent_ 
Filed this ____ day of __________ , 20 _ 
___________________ Clerk 
By ________________ Deputy 
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Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoeJ.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email ;jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389·9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED 
TH!RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Payette C;}unty, Idaho 
__ ~AY At..3 2009 P.M. 
l! ,D,puty 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 




RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE 1. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOI-IN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND 
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(FILED UNDER SEAL) 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (FILED UNDER 
SEAL) - 1 / ~t:ll.L 
Boisc·220623.J 0010908· 00008 .:;) 17 
!gJ002/011 
05/13/2009 18:29 FAX It! 003/011 
Comes now Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and replies to Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff Knipe Land Company's Motion for Leave to File First Amended 
Complaint dated May 7, 2009, as follows_ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff has filed two pretrial motions. Its Motion in Limine seeks only a detennination 
of whether Defendants may testify at trial about what the land purchase agreements they entered 
into with two prospective purchasers of their land "really" meant when those contracts are 
unambiguous, and whether they may theorize about what they "would have done" if only they 
had consciously appreciated that Plaintiff would assert its contractual rights. Plaintiff's Motion 
to include a claim for putative damages was similarly limited, focusing on whether the 
statements made by Defendant Richard Robertson in his December 30, 2008 Affidavit {the 
"Robertson Aff. ") satisfied the .requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1604(2). To Plaintiff s reading, 
the Robertson Aff. demonstrated that he consciously intended not to honor the 2007 Employment 
Contract when he signed it, as he did when he renewed both the 2005 and the 2007 Employment 
Contracts for additional terms in August 2007. (See Ex. 24 to deposition of Richard Robertson 
('~Robertson Dep. "), which was filed by Plaintiff in support of its Motion for Summary 
JUdgment). Such intent constituted the bad state of mind justifying a claim for punitive damages. 
Seininger Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 250, 118 P.3d 606,615 (2008); 
Myers v. Workmen's Aulo Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,502-03,95 P.3d 977,984-85 (2004). 
Defendants' response to Plaintiff's Motion. however, completely ignores anything 
expressed by Mr. Robertson in his Affidavit. Their brief in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
spends a little more than a page describing how the Robertsons are uneducated individuals while 
Plaintiff is an experienced real estate brokerage, and devotes the balance of its 20 pages to 
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recycling previously made arguments about why the Employment Contracts are legally 
unenforceable, why there was never any "forfeiture" of monies paid by rule the two prospective 
purchasers of Defendants' land, and how Plaintiffs representatives waived and abandoned their 
contractual right to the forfeited earnest money. Mr. Robertson also submits a new Affidavit, 
describing himself as an uneducated breeder and trainer of hunting dogs whose wife is a former 
janitor. Defendants also submit portions of the depositions of Plaintiff's president, Jolm Knipe, 
and its agent, Rowena Strain, none of which has anything to do with Richard Robertson's state of 
mind when he signed the relevant agreements. 
Given the foregoing, it appears that Defendants accept Plaintiff's analysis of the 
testimony in the Robertson Aff., and concede that he had, indeed, consciously intended to ignore 
the Employment Contracts' provision for sharing forfeited earnest monies when he signed the 
2007 agreement and again when he renewed both Employment Contracts that August. 
II. THE ELLSWORTH DOBBS DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THIS CONTROVERSY 
The issue of punitive damages turns On what Defendant Richard Robertson did. 
Defendants, however, devote what little space they have to him and his wife to describing what 
they think he was, an uneducated hunting dog trainer and "a part-time rancher," who was utterly 
inexperienced in buying and selling him and real estate. (See Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Its Complaint ("'Defendants' Memo") at 2-
3.) This is contrasted to Plaintiff, which is correctly described as an experienced and 
professional Idaho real estate brokerage. This commentary, which has nothing to do with 
Plaintifrs Motion to Amend, is probably designed to place Mr. and Mrs. Robertson within the 
social considerations discussed in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967), 
as adopted in Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 259, 260,846 P.2d 904,911 
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The Ellsworth Dobbs doctrine, which has not been previously raised, has no application 
to the present controversy. Lipsky adopted the doctrine only to the extent it determines "when" a 
broker has earned a real estate ··commission,1I and a "commission'~ in this respect is something 
distinct from the right to apportion forfeited earnest money. '·There should be no question as to 
whether or not a distinction in the law exists between a 'commission' and an agreed-to 
lapportionment of forfeited eamest money!" Guy Stickney, In.c. v. Underwood, 410 P.2d 7. 9 
(Wash. 1966). The fact that there has been no closing, and hence no entitlement to a 
commission, does not vitiate a separate contractual ,agreement to share forfeited earnest money. 
"Where a contract to which both the vendor and the broker are parties expressly stipulates the 
disposition to be made of the earnest money or down payment, as between them, such 
stipulations of courSe control.~' L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Relative Rights and Liabilities of 
Vendor an.d His Broker to Down Payment or Earnest Money Forfeited by Vendee for Default 
Under Real-Estate Conttact, 9 A,L.R.2d 495 § 2 (1950). However, Defendants' description of 
their background and how they approached the transactions in controversy raises questions about 
their candor. 
First, the portrait painted on pages 2 and 3 of Defendants' Memo is one of a barely-
educated dog trainer and "part-time rancher," and an Idaho homemaker. In other words, the 
I As noted in Plaintiff's contemporaneously filed Reply Memorandum in support of its 
Motion in Limine, the Favoretto case has been cited in only one published opinion, and even 
then only for the general proposition that the courts will not enforce illegal contracts. 
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social equivalents of the defendant homeowners in the Favoretto case, who found themselves 
being sued by their former broker for half of $3,200 in earnest money forfeited when a 
prospective purchaser refused to buy their house. The Favoretlo opinion contrasted the 
inexperienced homeowner defendants with the sophisticated plaintiff~ implicitly assuming that 
their disproportionate abilities inevitably lead to the fonner being treated unfairly by the latter. 
The reality of this case is far different. The Robertsons are the sole owners of more than 3,000 
acres of Idaho land. Rather than selling a modest residence, they were engaged in substantial 
commercial transactions, ultimately to sell their land to a utility company for $6 million. 
Individuals playing such a high-stakes game hardly need the protections that Fa'Voretto thought 
ordinary homeowners needed, especially when those individuals have regular counsel of the it 
own (see Robertson Dep., 134:24-135:21). 
Defendants' Memo, on page 3, claims that Mr. and Mrs. Robertson "totally relied on the 
advice of Knipe and Rowena Strain when they signed the Employment Contract." Review of 
Mr. Robertson's deposition and his Affidavits has failed to locate any testimony supporting this 
new claim. Rather than being Plaintiff's passive pawns, the record shows that Mr. and Mrs. 
Robertson were quite capable of looking after their own interests. For One thing, 1hese two 
supposedly naIve individuals had managed to acquire nearly five square miles of Idaho land, 
there would be coveted by a nuclear power company. More specifically, the 2005 Employment 
Contract (Ex. 3, Robertson Dep.) shows a negotiated reduction of the commission rate from 7% 
to 6% if <'no other real estate company is involved." The Robertsons made sure Plaintiff would 
receive no commission if they sold their property to certain named parties, including their currer ,t 
attorney; similar limitations are in the 2007 Employment Contract (Ex. 15, Robertson Dep.) and 
in the August 2007 agreements renewing both Contracts until February 28, 2008 (Ex. 24, 
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Robertson Dep,). The 7% commission in the printed portion of the 2007 Employment Contract 
was crossed out and changed to 6%, presumably at Defendants' demand. When the Employmen1 
Contracts were renewed in August of 2007, Defendants negotiated a further reduction in 
Plaintiff's commission rate-to 5%. (See Ex. 24, and 48:7-50:18, Robertson Dep.) 
Third, Defendants announce on page 2 of their Memo that they signed the 2005 
Employment Contract "[w]ithout consulting an attorney." (Defendants' emphasis.) They omit 
to mention that they had their own regular attorney throughout but apparently chose not to 
oonsult him. (See Robertson Dep., 134:24-135:21.) 
Most disconcerting is the statement on page 3 of Defendants' Memo that "[n]either 
Defendant, Richard A. Robertson or his wife JohImie has any experience in the sale of real 
estate," Mr. Robertson swears in' 7 of his latest Affidavit that he "and Johnnie Robertson had 
no professional experience or training in sellins real estate or other real estate matters." These 
bold denials of any familiarity with real estate transactions contrast starkly with Mr. Robertson's 
testimony at 30:8-25 of his deposition. When asked whether he read the 2005 Employment 
Contract before signing it, Mr. Robertson testified that he did: 
Q. Did you have an attorney look at it for you? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you bought and sold property before? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Had you seen documents of this sort before? 
A. Not exactly like this, no, but I had sold other properties. 
Q. All right. Commercial property or just personal residences or both? 
A. Both. 
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Q. And you dealt with other brokers and real estate agents? 
A. Yes. 
When asked why he demanded back the $22,500 the title company had dispersed to 
Plaintiff in anticipation of the commission that would be earned at the MidAmerican cloSing, Mr 
Robertson testified that, "[w]ell, I. .. on the real estate deals I've had in the past and in people thal 
I talk to, you don't pay a commission unless the sale is finished -." (Robertson Dep., 126:13-
16.) 
It is ironic that Mr. Robertson should play so fast and loose with his own sworn 
testimony when that testimony provides the basis for Plaintiff's request to allow a claim for 
punitive damages. Such tactics are all the more reason to allow such a claim to be made. 
In. DEFENDANTS' ATTACKS ON THE LEGALITY OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS AND WHETHER MONEY PAID BY THE HARMONS 
OR MIDAMERICAN WAS EVER "FORFEITEDu 
ARE IRRELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
Steadfastly ignoring the basis for Plaintiff s Motion to Amend, Defendants again argue 
that since neither the Harmons nOT MidAmerican ubreached" their purchase agreements, no 
earnest money was ever ''forfeited.'' The idea here seems to be that, because "earnest money" is 
intended to be the functional equivalent of "liquidated damages," their forfeiture presupposes a 
"breach" of the purchase agreement that originally required their payment. No authority is cited 
for this proposition. In reality, the fact that a land purchase contract anticipated the buyer's 
refusal to go through with the closing, with the consequence that the buyer abandons all benefit 
of previously deposited earnest money, is precisely what happened here. Moreover, the 
Employment Contracts do not require any "breach" or violation of a purchase agreement by a 
prospective buyer of Defendants' land. AU that the Employment Contracts require is that "a 
deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited ... ," and that is unquestionably 
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what happened when the Hannons and, later, MidAmerican refused to consummate their 
intended purchases ofDefendants l land. 
Defendants recycle their arguments about Plaintiff waiving its entitlement to a share of 
the prospective purchasers' earnest money. Those arguments were disposed of months ago by 
the Court when it decided the first Motions for Summary Judgment, just as it disposed of 
Defendants' persistently repeated claims that Idaho statutes, such as Idaho Code § 54-2051(4)(e) 
rendered the Employment Contracts void as a matter of law. 
Defendants also repeat their new argument that the Ellsworth Dobbs doctrine renders the 
earnest money provisions of the Employment Contracts legally unenforceable. As noted above, 
and as also discussed in Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine, 
Ellsworth Dobbs. as adopted in Lipsky, concerns only when a broker is deemed to have earned a 
real estate "commission," which must be distinguished from the present controversy'S concern 
with separate agreements to share forfeited earnest monies. In any event, such arguments have 
nothing to do with whether Richard Robertson's conduct justifies a claim for punitive damages. 
Defendants argue that the law is loath to enforce penalties and "forfeitures." They 
apparently reason that because the Employment Contracts entitle Plaintiff to half of "a deposit or 
amounts paid on account of purchase ... [that are] ... forfeited," that the law should not enfore!: 
such provision. The problem here is that the actual "forfeitures" in question did not take place in 
connection with the Employment Contracts, but rather arose from the decisions made by the 
Harmons and MidAmerican in connection with their own separate land purchase agreements 
with Defendants. If these were, indeed, prohibited ''forfeitures'' or "penalties," it would be for 
the Harrnons and MidAmerican to object~ and they have not done so. Moreover, this very 
argument was rejected in Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 258, 259,846 P.2d at 909, 910. 
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Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's proposal to drop its claim for specific 
performance because the time allowed for such perfonnance has expired should be denied and 
the claim be "dismissed" instead. The presumed point of this is to let Defendants to argue after 
trial that they "prevailed" on this claim and are therefore entitled to attorney's fees in that 
connection. The expiration of what was clearly described in the original Complaint as a limited 
time to perform cannot constitute a victory for Defendants. In any event, it will be for the Court 
to characterize the removal of that issue from the present controversy after triaL 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The only issue raised by Plaintiff in the instant Motion is whether Richard Robertson's 
expressed intentions justify a claim for punitive damages. Defendants> decision to oppose that 
request by arguing about everything but Mr. Robertson's expressed intentions justifies granting 
Plaintiffs Motion. 
DATED: May I.l. 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
M.&;~---&· £ 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MARK S. GESTON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Stoel Rives LLP, counsel of record for 
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants, and as such have personal knowledge of the matters set forth 
herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a full and accurate copy of PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
DEFENDANTS, containing the Second Requests for Production propounded to Defendants and 
served on their attorney of record by hand delivery on April 2, 2009. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is true copy of the "runner's slip" as used by this 
firm, and which indicates the delivery of said Requests for Production as indicated by the 
signature of Defendants' attorney Derek Pica thereto. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true copy of an email directed to Defendants' 
attorney Derek Pica on May 6, 2009, regarding receipt of the responses to the Requests, as well 
as noting the reason for the Requests. 
5. As of the execution of this Affidavit, no reply has been received from Derek Pica, 
nor have Defendants filed any objections to the specified Requests. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
Mar~~ 
om to before me this I~ day of May, 2009. 
N~rS~ah~ 
My Commission Expires /,)..- 31- LLll3 
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below on this/£ day of May, 2009. 
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TO: DEFENDANTS RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON 
AND ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC. AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company ("Plaintiff'), by and through its counsel Stoel 
Rives LLP, hereby requests that within thirty (30) days of service hereof Defendants Richard A. 
Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson, Husband and Wife, and Robertson Kennels, Inc., produce 
and permit the inspection and photocopying of the documents hereinafter designated at the 
offices of Stoel Rives LLP located at 101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900, Boise, Idaho 83702. 
If you contend that any documents requested below are privileged, in whole or in part, or 
otherwise object to any part of the discovery request, or believe that any requested information 
would be excludable from production to Plaintiff in discovery, regardless of its relevance, you 
should identify with particularity each document or part thereof for which you claim a privilege, 
state the reasons for such objection or grounds for exclusion, and identify each person or entity 
having knowledge of the factual basis, if any, on which the privilege or ground is asserted. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 21: Produce copies of the 2006 and 2007 state 
and federal income tax returns, together with any accompanying schedules, filed by Richard A. 
Robertson andlor Johnnie L. Robertson. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 22: Produce copies of the 2006 and 2007 state 
and federal income tax returns, together with any accompanying schedules, filed by Robertson 
Kennels, Inc. 
<signature on next page> 
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DATED: April t-;- 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
~~--
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SECOND 
SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS on the 
following, in the matter indicated below on this '1,/ day of April, 2009. 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ vrVia Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Geston, Mark S. 
Wednesday, May 06, 2009 11: 11 AM 
'Derek Pica' 
Johnston, Kathy E.; Frost, Darin S.; Reinhardt, Jennifer M. 
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson 
My records indicate that Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs Second Request for documents where due on 
Monday. Could you please advise when I will receive the requested 2006 and 2007 tax returns, or call me at 
your first opportunity so we can discuss any problems these Requests pose? The tax returns were requested, 
first, because Defendants have taken the position that the payment of taxes on the Harmon and MidAmerican 
earnest monies constituted detrimental reliance on their part, supporting their affirmative defenses of estoppel 
and waiver, and, secondly, because they will be relevant to the issue of punitive damages should the court let 
Plaintiff add such a claim to its Complaint. 
Mark S. Geston 
STOEL RIVES LLP 1101 S. Capitol Blvd, Suite 1900 I Boise, ID 83702-7705 
Direct: (208) 387-4291 I Mobile: (208) 860-9860 I Fax: (208) 389-9040 
msgeston@stoel.com I www.stoel.com 
1 
1'+15 
Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Rule 26(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permits parties to "obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action." Discovery is not limited solely to admissible matters. Instead, "I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(1) permits broad discovery of any matter that is not privileged, even if it is inadmissible, so 
long as it is 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ", Kirk v. 
Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 703-04,116 P.3d 27,34 (2005). 
Defendants' Ninth Affirmative Defense claims that Plaintiff's right to recovery is barred 
by the doctrine of estoppel. The successful assertion of this defense must include a showing by 
Defendants that they acted to their detriment in reliance upon Plaintiff's conduct. Frantz v. 
Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1010, 729 P.2d 1068, 1073 eCt. App. 1986). In this case, Defendants 
claim that Plaintiff's failed to make an affirmative demand for half of the earnest money 
forfeited after the first prospective purchaser of their land, the Harmons, refused to actually 
purchase that property. On the basis of such alleged inaction, Defendants claim that they 
reasonably concluded that Plaintiff had not only declined to assert any right to the Harmons' 
forfeited earnest money but that Plaintiff would similarly decline to assert any entitlement to 
earnest money that would be forfeited by any subsequent purchaser of their land, including the 
prospective purchaser who signed land purchase agreements with them in September and 
October of 2007. This second prospective purchaser also ultimately declared that it would not 
purchase their land in January 2008. Defendants therefore kept all of the earnest money forfeited 
by both these prospective purchasers and now argue that they acted to their detriment when they 
paid income taxes on the half of those forfeited monies that Plaintiff now claims. Such an 
argument entitles Plaintiff to demand that the Defendants produce the income tax returns proving 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANTS, AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
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such payments and, consequently, those returns were requested by Plaintiff in its Second Request 
for the Production Documents. That Request was properly served on Defendants' attorney. 
When the time allowed by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 34 for a response expired without 
eliciting any documents, Plaintiffs attorney wrote to Defendants' attorney, asking when the tax 
returns would be received and asking for a consultation if the Request posed any problems or 
difficulties. As the date of this writing, Plaintiff has received no response to that inquiry. 
Defendants have not filed any formal objections to production of the requested documents. 
Second, it has lately emerged that Defendants intend to portray themselves as 
commercially naIve and uneducated people pursuing a modest business training hunting dogs 
and part-time ranching. The requested income tax returns are relevant to show the scope of 
Defendants' business endeavors and whether such claims are authentic. 
Third, Plaintiff has asked for permission to amend its Complaint to include a claim for 
punitive damages. Defendants' income and assets, as documented in their income tax returns, 
will be additionally relevant to this claim if it is permitted. 
Given the foregoing, the Court should order the immediate production of the subject tax 
returns and award Plaintiff its fees and costs necessitated by the Motion to Compel. 
DATED: Mayl(, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANTS, 
AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES(FILED UNDER SEAL) on the following, in the matter 
indicated below on this I(f day of May, 2009. 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[t.--J Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff Knipe Land Company, by and through its counsel of record, 
Stoel Rives LLP, and moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 
37(a)(2) for an Order compelling the Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs Second Set of Requests 
for Production to Defendants served on Defendants on April 2, 2009. 
In compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(2), the undersigned counsel 
certifies that he has in good faith attempted to confer with Defendants' counsel in an effort to 
secure the disclosure of the requested documents without court action, and a copy of his email to 
Defendants' counsel, so inquiring, is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiffs counsel has not 
received a response to that correspondence as of the date of this Motion. 
Plaintiff requests its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with this Motion, 
as permitted by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4). 
This motion is based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein and the supporting 
Memorandum and Affidavit of Mark S. Geston filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED: May tr, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANTS, AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
on the following, in the matter indicated below on this/q day of May, 2009. 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
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Geston, Mark S. 
Wednesday, May 06, 2009 11: 11 AM 
'Derek Pica' 
Johnston, Kathy E.; Frost, Darin S.; Reinhardt, Jennifer M. 
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson 
My records indicate that Defendants' responses to Plaintiff's Second Request for documents where due on 
Monday. Could you please advise when I will receive the requested 2006 and 2007 tax returns, or call me at 
your first opportunity so we can discuss any problems these Requests pose? The tax returns were requested, 
first, because Defendants have taken the position that the payment of taxes on the Harmon and MidAmerican 
earnest monies constituted detrimental reliance on their part, supporting their affirmative defenses of estoppel 
and waiver, and, secondly, because they will be relevant to the issue of punitive damages should the court let 
Plaintiff add such a claim to its Complaint. 
Mark S. Geston 
STOEL RIVES LLP 1101 S. Capitol Blvd, Suite 1900 I Boise, ID 83702-7705 
Direct: (208) 387-4291 I Mobile: (208) 860-9860 I Fax: (208) 389-9040 
msgeston@stoel.com I www.stoel.com 
1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
********** 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
COURT REPORTER: Denece Graham 
DATE: May 15, 2009 
Knipe Land Company, etal, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-2008-000682 
-vs-
Richard A. Robertson, etal, 
Defendants. 
COURT MINUTES 
Time: 2:02-2:30 p.m. 
Courtroom #1 
This being the time and place set for the pre-trial conference, 
plaintiff's motion for leave to file first amended complaint, 
plaintiff's motion in limine, defendant's motion to reconsider 
and/or motion for clarification, and defendant's motion for 
summary judgment as to earnest money, present before the Honorable 
Stephen W. Drescher were Mark Geston; counsel for the plaintiff, 
and Derek Pica; counsel for the defendant. 
Mr. Geston made a presentation regarding the plaintiff's motions. 
Mr. Pica responded 
defendant's motions. 
and presented argument 
Mr. Geston presented his final remarks to the Court. 
The parties held the pre-trial conference. 
regarding the 
The Court advised he would have to review the motions and make his 
ruling in a timely manner. 
There was some discussion regarding the setting of the other 
trials on the date set for this trial. 
Court was adjourned. 
STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
Betty J. ressen, Clerk 
BY: 
Court Minutes page-l-
Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoe1.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Comes now Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and respectfully moves the Court under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3) for leave to file a supplemental memorandum opposing 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Earnest Money Paid by MidAmerican 
("Defendants' Motion"), which was argued to the Court on May 15, 2009. Plaintiff submitted its 
brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion or about April 30, 2009, arguing that, among other 
things, it could not be considered to be a "party" to the Agreements to Sell and Purchase 
Defendants entered into with a prospective buyer of their real property on October 21, 2009, 
because Plaintiff was identified in such contracts only as Defendants' "agent." Plaintiff also 
argued that Defendants could not claim that the said Agreements to Sell and Purchase modified 
the Employment Contracts Plaintiff and Defendants had entered into in 2005 and 2007 because 
Plaintiff received nothing of value to support any such purported modification. Plaintiff now 
requests the Court's permission to submit a supplemental memorandum of law providing further 
authority to support these two contentions, both of which appeared on page 8 of its prior 
memorandum opposing Defendants' Motion. 
It is left to the Court's discretion to grant or deny a request to submit a post-hearing brief. 
Great Plains Equip. v. Nw. Pipeline, 136 Idaho 466, 473,36 P.3d 218, 225 (2001). The court in 
the Great Plains case rejected a post-hearing brief because the court had not asked for it and the 
parties had had sufficient opportunity to set forth their respective positions in the course of 
regular briefing and at the hearing. Plaintiff nevertheless believes that the Court should in this 
instance grant the present request to bring additional authority to its attention since such 
authority simply clarifies and further supports contentions of law already made to the Court. The 
additional briefing Plaintiff wishes to cite does not implicate any new issues of fact. It should 
also be noted that Defendants' Motion, as well as their companion Motion to Reconsider and/or 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT POST -HEARING MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW (FILED UNDER SEAL) - 2 
Boise-220790,1 0010908-00008 
to Clarify the Court's February 12,2009 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, renewed and 
substantially amplified contentions of law they had previously briefed to the Court and argued 
with respect to their first Motion for Summary Judgment, served on or about December 31,2008. 
Plaintiff should be allowed a similar opportunity to present relevant authority to the Court. 
Plaintiff would have no objection to Defendant responding to its post-hearing brief 
should be Court grant its request. Plaintiff does not ask for any further oral argument of the 
previous Motions or of this Motion, which it asks the Court to decide without oral argument. 
A copy of Plaintiff s proposed memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
DATED: May(~, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM OF LAW (FILED 
UNDER SEAL) on the following, in the matter indicated below on thisjo., day of May, 2009. 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[-1'\fia Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Han:d Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
"tvlark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Among other defenses raised by Defendants in their first Motion for Summary Judgment 
was the argument that the contracts they entered into with a third party in October 2007 to sell 
their land ("the MidAmerican Contracts") to that party legally invalidated Plaintiffs right to 
share in earnest money forfeited by such a third party specified in the Employment Contracts 
Plaintiff and Defendants entered into in September 2005 and February 2007. The Court 
nevertheless determined in its February 12,2009 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment that 
the Employment Contracts between Plaintiff and Defendants "were valid and suffer from no 
legal deficiency." 
Defendants subsequently renewed their arguments that the Employment Contracts are 
legally invalid in their Motion to Reconsider andlor Motion for Clarification and their Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Earnest Money paid by MidAmerican. Both of these Motions 
substantially elaborated on Defendants' previous argument that, as a matter of law, the 
MidAmerican Contracts neutralized and nullified the Employment Contracts' provisions for the 
equal sharing of forfeited earnest monies. Plaintiff submitted briefs opposing these Motions and 
both were argued to the Court on May 15, 2009. 
As pointed out on page 8 of Plaintiffs prior memorandum opposing Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment as to Earnest Money Paid by MidAmerican, the Employment Contracts 
should not, as a matter of law, be deemed to have been "merged" into the subsequent 
MidAmerican Contracts since Plaintiffwas not a "party" to the MidAmerican Contracts. Even 
though Plaintiff was a signatory to the MidAmerican Contracts, it appears in those documents 
only as Defendants' "agent," and was explicitly identified as such in Section 14 of each one. A 
copy of one of the three MidAmerican Contracts accompanied Plaintiffs memorandum in 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO EARNEST MONEY 
PAID BY MIDAMERICAN (FILED UNDER SEAL) - 2 
Boise-220794.1 0010908-00008 
1"'8~ 
support of its Motion in Limine; Section 14 reads the same in that Contract as it does in the other 
two. 
A person or entity signing a contract as the agent of another does not become a party to 
that contract and the contract may not be enforced against it. See Restatement of Agency 2nd 
(1958), § 320, which was cited in Gen. Motors Accep. Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 36 
Idaho 691,696,697,535 P.2d 664, 669, 670 (1975) ("A person making a contract with another 
as an agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract. A principal is 
'disclosed' if, at the time of making the contract in question, the other party to it has noticed that 
the agent is asking for a principal and of the principal's identity."). Because Plaintiff was 
explicitly identified in the MidAmerican Contracts only as Defendants' agent and the purchaser 
assertively knew that Defendants were Plaintiffs principal, it cannot be contended that the prior 
Employment Contracts, to which Plaintiff was obviously a "party," were "merged" into the 
MidAmerican Contracts because Plaintiff is not a party to them. Conversely, the third-party 
purchaser of Defendants' land under the MidArnerican Contracts was not a party to the 2007 
land purchase contracts. The doctrine of merger therefore does not apply to the present 
controversy for this reason, along with those other considerations raised in Plaintiffs prior 
memorandum and at oral argument of Defendants' Motion on May 15. 
Plaintiff also pointed out on page 8 of its prior memorandum that it could not be 
reasonably said that it intended to renounce its contractual right to half of any earnest money that 
might later be forfeited if a prospective purchaser of Defendants' land did not consummate its 
purchase agreement, because Plaintiff received nothing of value in return for such a purported 
modification of its Employment Contracts. This argument addressed Defendants' apparent 
contention that the MidAmerican Contracts modified the prior Employment Contracts, as 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO EARNEST MONEY 
PAID BY MIDAMERICAN (FILED UNDER SEAL) - 3 
Boise-220794.! OO! 0908-00008 1~8.3 
distinguished from the latter being merged into the former. In this connection, it has been held 
that a contract cannot be modified unless the modification is supported by new, valid 
consideration. BrandS Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733, 639 P.2d 429, 431 (1981). Since 
Plaintiff would not have received anything of value in return for the purported renunciation of its 
right to receive half of forfeited earnest monies, it cannot be contended that MidAmerican 
Contracts modified the preceding Employment Contracts in any respect. 
The foregoing authority supplements Plaintiff's prior briefing and does not waive or 
diminish any of the other arguments or citations to authority previously made by Plaintiff in its 
opposition to the Motions of Defendants that were argued on May 15,2009. 
DATED: May_, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
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[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
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Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Plaintiff Knipe Land Company, by and through its 
undersigned counsel. hereby withdraws its Motion to Compel Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs Second Set of Requests for Production to Defendants, and for Attorneys' Fees dated 
and served on May 14,2009; on May 22,2009, Plaintiff received Defendants' Responses and the 
documents requested, and the matter is now moot. 
DATED: May~ 2009. 
STOEL RIVES w) 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise,ID 83702 
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Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
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CASE NO. CV-2008-00682 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
ORDER 
The above-entitled matter came on for pretrial conference May 18, 2009. Mark Geston was 
present on behalf ofthe Plaintiff. Derek Pica was present on behalf of the Defendant. Based upon 
the representations of the parties IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Stipulations and Agreements of Parties: All exhibits are admitted by stipulation. 
2. Issues in Dispute: Liability, if any, of the respective parties and existing contracts. 
3. Mediation Issues: Mediation failed. 
4. Discovery Issues: No Court intervention is required. 
PRETruALCONFERENCEORDER 
5. The Jury Trial is set for June 23,2009 at 9:00 a.m. 
6. The parties are to comply with the remainder of the Order Setting Case for Trial and 
Pretrial filed the 25th day of November, 2008. 
7. Objectio 's Pretrial Order shall be filed withi 
DAT§daYOf , tl09. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 




een (14) days. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Pretrial Conference Order 
was forwarded to the following persons on this ~ day of May, 2009. 
Mark S. Geston 
STOEL RIVERS 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Derek A. Pica 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 302 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER 
BETTY DRESSEN 
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CASE NO. CV-2008-682 
ORDER ON 
MOTIONS 
Appearances: Mark Geston for Plaintiff 
Derek Pica for Defendants 
This matter comes before the Court on mUltiple motions advanced by both parties. Based 
upon the presentations of the parties and review of the record in this matter, this Court finds as 
follows: 
The Plaintiff seeks leave from the Court to amend the Complaint in two particulars: to 
eliminate the Third Claim for Relief, which concerns the exclusive listing period, and to add 
punitive damages. The amendment to eliminate the above-mentioned cause of action comports 
with the evidence in the record, is appropriate under the circumstances, and will not prejudice the 
opposing party. The Motion to Amend in that regard is therefore permitted pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 
The Plaintiff also seeks to amend to add punitive damages. A court shall allow a motion 
to amend the pleadings if, after weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes that the 
moving party has established at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial 
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. I.C. § 6-1604. Punitive damages are not 
favored in the law and should be awarded in only the most unusual and compelling 
circumstances. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hasp., 122 Idaho 47, 52, 830 P.2d 1185, 1190 
(1992). The issue of punitive damages "revolves around whether the plaintiff is able to establish 
the requisite 'intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad state of mind.' " Myers v. 
Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 503,95 P.3d 977,985 (2004) (citing Linscott v. Rainier 
Nat!. Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980)). The action required to 
support an award of punitive damages is that the defendant "acted in a manner that was 'an 
2 
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extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the 
defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences.' " Id at 502, 95 P.3d 
at 984 (citing Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661,669 (1983)). 
The mental state required to support an award of punitive damages is " 'an extremely harmful 
state of mind, whether that be termed malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence; malice, 
oppression, wantonness; or simply deliberate or willful.' " Id,' Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North 
Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 249-250,178 P.3d 606,614 - 615 (2008). 
After consideration of the facts and circumstances in this matter in their totality, this 
Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial to 
support an award of punitive damages. The actions of both parties in this matter appear to be 
consistent with an ordinary breach of contract case and, at least at this stage, do not rise to the 
level of an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, nor is there presently 
sufficient evidence concerning the required mental state. The Motion to Amend to add punitive 
damages is therefore denied. 
Turning next to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants assert 
that the two Purchase and Sale Agreements between them and the unnamed purchaser were 
signed by both Plaintiff and Defendants. In addition, they assert that the contracts have merger 
clauses; the result being that any pre-existing employment contracts cannot be considered with 
respect to the earnest money as such contracts were merged into the Purchase and Sale 
Agreements. Because the Purchase and Sale Agreements dictate that the earnest money is to be 
paid to the Defendants, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the earnest 
money. 
3 
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"[U]nder law of merger, prior agreements, covenants, and conversations are merged into 
the final, formal, written contracts executed by the parties." Davidson v. Davidson, 916 S.W.2d 
918, 922 (Tenn.App.1995)("[T]he last agreement concerning the same subject matter that has 
been signed by all parties supersedes all former agreements, and the last contract is the one that 
embodies the true agreement.")(quoting Magnolia Group v. Metropolitan Development & 
Housing Agency, 783 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn.App.1989)); Stuart v. D'Ascenz, 22 P.3d 540, 542 -
543 (Colo.App.2000). 
Applying the merger doctrine to the facts of this case presents multiple problems. Most 
significantly, the contracts do not concern the same fundamental subject matter. While it is true 
that they both deal with the sale of property and earnest money, the employment contracts 
delineate the underlying contractual relationship and obligations between the Defendant sellers 
and the Plaintiff, their agent, while the Purchase and Sale Agreements set forth the specific terms 
of the specific sale between the unnamed purchaser and the sellers. Because the agreements 
differ as to subject matter, this Court finds the merger doctrine is not applicable. As the merger 
doctrine is inapplicable, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding what money, if any, 
was owed to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. 
Finally, the Court comes to Defendants' Motion to Reconsider pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
11 (a)(2) and/or Motion for Clarification. There is no new evidence before the Court, as it 
appears the e-mail referenced by the defense was available to them at the time of the initial 
presentations on this matter. Further, the e-mail appears to be from a point in time when the sale 
to the unnamed purchaser was still expected to close. The information in that e-mail is 
consistent with the other evidence from the same time period. 
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With respect to the issue of the statute of frauds under Idaho Code §54-2050 and §2051, 
this Court does not believe that those statutes are applicable in the case at hand. Rather, the 
statutes appear to be applicable in the context of an administrative hearing by the Commission 
against a broker. Even if they are applicable, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that 
" ... recovery of a broker's real estate commission need not depend upon a legal description of the 
property which would satisfy the requirements for specific performance of a real estate sales 
contract. Rather, recovery of a broker's commission is possible provided it is shown that there is 
no misunderstanding between the property owner and the broker as to the property to be offered 
for sale, and where it is sufficient to enable the broker to locate the property, show it, and point 
out its boundaries to a prospective purchaser." Garfield v. Tindall, 98 Idaho 841, 843-844, 573 
P.2d 966,968-69 (1978); C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 516-17,547 P.2d 
1116,1121-22 (1976); Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306,311,442 P.2d442, 
447 (1968). Shields & Co., Inc. v. Green 100 Idaho 879, 882, 606 P.2d 983,986 (1980). The 
Court believes that this policy is applicable here, even though this case does not deal with a 
commission, but rather with allegedly forfeited earnest money. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the parties were able to 
determine the property for sale, and that property was able to be located and shown to a 
prospective purchaser. Therefore, the statute of frauds as argued by the Defendants, if applicable 
at all, is satisfied and the employment contracts are valid. For these reasons, the Defendants' 
Motion is denied. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS 
ORDER 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is GRANTED IN PART AND 
DENIED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Reconsider 
pursuant to and/or Motion for Clarification is DENIED. 
Dated this 
~--
ORDER ON MOTIONS 
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Stephen W. Drescher 
District Judge 
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Comes now Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, and for causes of action and claims for relief 
against Defendants; and each of them, compJains and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff was at all times relevant hereto and remains an Idaho cotporation with its 
prinoipal place of business in Boise~ Ada County, Idaho. PlaintifPs principaJ business was at all 
times relevant hereto and remains that of an agent and broker for the purchase and sale of real 
property in Idaho and adjoining states. Plaintiff was actively licensed as a real estate broker in 
Idaho at the time the facts upon which each of the causes of action and claims for relief alleged 
below are founded occurred and remains so licensed as of the present date. 
2, That at all times relevant hereto, Defendants Richard A. Robenson and Johnnie L. 
Robertson (collectively, "the Robertsons") were, and remain, husband and wife, domiciled in 
Payette County, Idaho. 
3. Defendant, Robenson Kennels, Inc. ("Robertson Kennels") was at all times 
relevant hereto and remains an Idaho corporation with its principal place of business located in 
Payette COW'llY, Idaho. Upon infonnation and belief, Defendants the Robertsons were at all 
times relevant hereto and remain officers and directors of Robertson Kennels and have and 
continue to own a majority, ifnot all outstanding shares of stock in that corporation. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, the Robertsons owned certain real property in Payette 
County consisting of approximately 1400 acres ("the Robertsons' Property"), upon which their 
personal residence is located. At all times relevant hereto, Robertson Kennels owned 
approximately 1887 acres of real property in Payette County ("the Kennels' Property"») which 
property adjoined the Robertsons' Property. The Robertsons' Property and the Kennels! 
Property comprise, in practical effect, a single parcel and are collectively referred to herein as 
"the Payette Ranch." 
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5. Or about September 1, 200S, Plaintiff and the Robertsons entered into an 
·'Employment Contract! ("the 2005 Employment Contract") whereby the Robertsons granted 
Plaintiff an exclusive listing to sell the Robertsons' Property under the tenus set forth therein. A 
copy of the 2005 Employment Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit A and made a part hereof 
by this reference. 
6. On or about February 6, 2007, the Robertsons and Robertsons Kennels entered 
into an "Employment Contract" ('Itbe 2007 Employment Contract") whereby they granted 
Plaintiff an exclusive listing to sell the Kennels' Property under the tenns set forth therein. A 
copy of the 2007 Employment Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part hereof by 
this reference. 
7. Both the September 2005 Employment Contract and the February 2007 
Employment Contract provided that Plaintiff would be entitled to one-half of any forfeited 
deposit or amount paid by a prospective buyer on account of any purchase of the Robertsons' 
Property or the Kennels' Property. 
8. The 200S Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract both provide 
that Plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorney's fees in any action it brings to enforce the terms 
thereof. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
9. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges each and every allegation set forth in Paragraphs 1 
through 8~ above, and alleges as follows for its first Claim for Relief against Defendants: 
10. On or about November 1, 2005, Plaintiff produced potential buyers for the 
Robertsons' Property, Robert and Sheila Harmon ("the Harmons"). The Hannons paid the 
Robertsons $50,000 earnest monies on account of their anticipated purchase of the Robertsons' 
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Property. Plaintiff acted as Defendants' exclusive real estate agentlbroker with respect to this 
transaction. 
II . On or about August 18. 2006, the Hannons withdrew their offer to purchase the 
Robertsons' Property and consequently forfeited $35,000 of tile monies previously paid by them 
on account of the purchase of the Robertsons' Property. 
12. Under the terms of the 2005 Employment Contract, Plaintiff was entitled to one-
half of the said monies paid by the Harmons on account of the purchase of the Robertsons' 
Property and forfeited by them when they terminated their offer to do so. 
J 3. Plaintiff has made demand upon Defendants for the payment of one-half of the 
monies forfeited by the Hannons, or $17,500, together with statutory interest thereon at the rate 
of 12% per year from August 18,2006, but Defendants have expressly rejected such demand. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
14. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges each and every allegation set forth in Paragraphs) 
through 8, above, and for its Second Claim for Relief against Defendants, alleges as follows: 
15. In September 2007, a confidential third party offered to purchase the Payette 
Ranch and Plaintiff acted as Defendants' exclusive real estate broker/agent with respect thereto 
under the terms of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract. 
16. The said third-party purchaser of the Payette Ranch withdrew its offer to purchaSE 
that real propeny on January 25,2008. Before doing so, however, the said purchaser had paid 
Defendants a confidential amount on account of the purchase of the Payette Ranch, which sum 
was forfeited upon withdrawal of its offer to do so. 
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17. Under the terms of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment 
Contract, Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the monies paid by the said third-party purchaser on 
account of its purchase of the Payette Ranch. 
18. Shortly after the said thirduparty purchaser withdrew its offer to purchase the 
Payette Ranch, Defendants paid Plaintiff $22,500 in connection therewith, but no more. 
19. Plaintiff has made demand upon Defendants for the payment of one-half of the 
monies paid by the said third party purchaser on account of the purchase of the Payette Ranch, 
less the $22,500 already paid by Defendants to Plaintiff with respect thereto, and for statutory 
interest thereon from January 25, 2008, but Defendants have expressly rejected such demand and 
have demanded return of the said $22,500 to them. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For judgment in the principaJ amount of $17,500, plus statutory interest thereon 211 
the rate of 12% per year from August 18, 2006, such sums representing the one-half interest in 
the monies paid by the Hannons to Defendants that Plaintiffis entitled to under the tenns of the 
2005 Employment Contract. 
2. For judgment in an amount representing one-half of the monies paid by the 
confidential third-party purchaser on account of its offer to purchase the Payette Ranch that 
Plaintiff is entitled to under the tenns of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 
Employment Contract, less the $22,500 already paid by Defendants to Plaintiff, together with 
statutory interest thereon at the rate of 12% per year frQm January 25,2008. 
3. For all attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff herein as allowed by the 2005 
Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract and by Idaho Code § 12>-120. In the 
event judgment is entered herein by default. a reasonable attorney's fee is $7,500. 
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4. For costs incurred in this action, 
5. For such other and further relief as may be just and equitable. 
DATED: June~,2008. 
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STOEL RIVES I.I.P 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT on the following, in the matter indicated below on this It> day of June, 2009. 
Derek A. Pica. PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336,,4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This suit is a conventional breach of contract action. It is agreed that Defendants have 
kept nearly all the earnest money forfeited by two potential buyers of their real property, in 
contravention of explicit provisions in the two real estate brokerage agreements Plaintiff and 
Defendants entered into. Given the Court's prior rulings on Motions, it appears that Defendants' 
sole remaining defenses are that, first, a purely semantic argument that the earnest monies 
abandoned by the two purchasers when they declined to go through with the purchase of 
Defendants' land was somehow not "forfeited," and, secondly, that Plaintiff impliedly waived its 
entitlement to half the money forfeited by both purchasers because it did not demand its share of 
the first purchasers' earnest money until about 18 months after the purchasers declined to 
purchase the land in question. 
Plaintiff, Knipe Land Co. ("Knipe") is an Idaho corporation licensed by the State of 
Idaho as a real estate brokerage and agency. As such, it has represented sellers of agricultural 
and commercial real estate in Idaho and in adjoining states for years. It participated in the 
relevant events through its president, John Knipe, and its licensed agent, Rowena Swain. 
Defendants Richard Robertson and Johnnie Robertson acquired the land in question as a 
single parcel in the late 1990s. They then divided title to that land so that they owned 
approximately 1400 acres in their individual names, and Defendant Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
owned the remaining 1886 acres. Robertson Kennels, Inc. is an Idaho corporation wholly owned 
by Mr. and Mrs. Robertson and their son, and it participated in the relevant events through its 
president, Richard Robertson. In practical effect, the two parcels comprise a single piece of 
property that Mr. and Mrs. Robertson occupy as their residence and on which they operate their 
hunting and dog breeding and training businesses. 
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Mr. and Mrs. Robertson signed a listing contract, or "Employment Contract," with Knipe 
in September 2005, appointing Knipe as their exclusive real estate agent to sell the parcel they 
owned in their own names ("the 2005 Employment Contract"). The 2005 Employment Contract 
specified a commission for Knipe in the event the property was sold, and also provided that 
"[s]hould a deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof may be 
retained by you [Knipe], as the Broker, as the balance shall be paid to me [Mr. and Mrs. 
Ro bertson]." 
Knipe found a potential buyer for Mr. and Mrs. Robertson's land, the Harmons, who 
signed a purchase agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Robertson on November 1, 2005, conditioned on 
the Harmons first selling other property that they owned. This contract anticipated a sale of Mr. 
and Mrs. Robertson's land to the Harmons for $2,475,000, of which the Harmons immediately 
paid $50,000 as earnest money. When the Harmons encountered difficulty selling their own 
property, Mr. and Mrs. Robertson agreed that the purchase contract should be extended by 
making $35,000 of the $50,000 previously deposited, nomefundable and increasing the purchase 
price. Because that $35,000 was no longer subject to the contract's contingency, Knipe, which 
had held the Harmons' $50,000 in trust, contemporaneously disbursed the $35,000 to Mr. and 
Mrs. Robertson. 
The Harmons finally decided they could not consummate the transaction, and in August 
2006 served notice of termination of the land purchase agreement on Mr. and Mrs. Robertson. 
The remaining $15,000 of the $50,000 they originally deposited was refunded to them since it 
was still subject to the contingency. 
Although the 2005 Employment Contract entitled Knipe to half of the $35,000 disbursed 
to Mr. and Mrs. Robertson before the Harmons terminated their contract, Mr. and Mrs. 
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Robertson kept all of that forfeited money. Through a mix-up in office communications, Knipe 
did not immediately demand the money from those Defendants. Indeed, no one said anything 
about Knipe's entitlement to one-half of the Harmons' forfeited money or gave the issue any 
thought until about a year and a half later, shortly before the present litigation began. 
Defendants next decided to list the portion of their land titled in the name of Robertson 
Kennels, Inc. with Knipe for sale. A second Employment Contract was signed by Robertson 
Kennels, Inc. and Knipe on February 6, 2007 ("the 2007 Employment Contract"), making Knipe 
the exclusive agent for the sale of that parcel. This Employment Contract contained the same 
provision for the equal sharing of forfeited earnest money by Knipe and Defendants as did the 
2005 Employment Contract. 
The parties then agreed to extend the effective terms of both the 2005 Employment 
Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract until February 28,2008, making Knipe the 
Defendants' exclusive real estate broker for the sale of all their land. Knipe found a buyer for 
the land in September 2007, MidAmerican Nuclear Energy Co., LLC ("MidAmerican,,).l After 
preliminary negotiations, during which Defendants rejected an unconditional offer by 
MidAmerican to buy their land on the spot for $4.5 million, Defendants and MidAmerican 
entered into a "Sell and Purchase Agreement" on September 24,2007. MidAmerican made an 
initial, nonrefundable payment of $150,000 against a total purchase price of $6 million under this 
1 The land purchase contracts signed by Defendants and MidAmerican in September and 
October 2007 contained confidentiality provisions which Knipe and Defendants have honored in 
this litigation. However, with the passage oftime it appears that preservation of the 
confidentiality is no longer of practical importance to MidAmerican and it has consented to the 
parties disclosing its identity and the financial particulars of its planned purchase of Defendants' 
land at the trial of this matter. 
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contract.2 The sale was to close by December 31,2007, giving MidAmerican the opportunity to 
go on Defendants' land and decide whether it wanted to go ahead with the actual purchase. The 
contract provided that the monies MidAmerican would have paid against the purchase price 
would be forfeited to Defendants if MidAmerican ultimately declined to go through with the 
transaction. 
The original September Sale and Purchase Agreement was replaced on October 21, 2007, 
by three separate agreements, all of which were in the same basic form, separately conveying 
Mr. and Mrs. Robertson's real property, Robertson Kennels, Inc.'s real property, and a small 
parcel with the Robertsons' house on it to MidAmerican. The change in documentation was for 
the convenience of Defendants' tax planning. MidAmerican's purchase of Defendants' real 
property was still to take place as a single transaction for $6 million. 
MidAmerican ultimately paid $450,000 in nonrefundable deposits on its intended 
purchase of Defendants' real property. Because the three payments making up that sum were 
agreed to be nonrefundable, each was disbursed by the escrow holder promptly after it was 
received from MidAmerican, 95% to Defendants and 5% to Knipe. The 5% Knipe received, 
$22,500, represented Knipe's commission share of what was then anticipated would be the sale 
of the property to MidAmerican. However, MidAmerican informed Defendants on January 25, 
2008, that it did not wish to go through with the transaction after all and expressly disavowed 
any claim to the $450,000, which was to be Defendants' sole remedy for the termination. Knipe 
thereupon demanded one-half of the money paid by MidAmerican, less the $22,500 it had 
already received from the escrow holder with Defendants' consent. Defendants refused, 
2 Although it may be a matter of factual dispute, Knipe believes that Defendants paid less 
than $1 million for the same land 9 or 10 years earlier. 
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terminated both Employment Contracts, and demanded that Knipe pay them the $22,500. Knipe 
demanded one-halfthe payments forfeited by the Harmons and Defendants rejected that too. 
This litigation ensued. 
II. ISSUES AT TRIAL 
Knipe initially raised several legal objections to the validity of the 2005 Employment 
Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, but the Orders entered by the Court on February 12 
and June 9, 2009, determined as a matter of law that both Employment Contracts "were valid and 
suffer from no legal deficiency." The Court's June 9 Order additionally determined that the Sell 
and Purchase contracts between Defendants and MidAmerican had no effect on the 2005 and 
2007 Employment Contracts' terms or effectiveness. 
Unusually-particularly since the parties are preparing for a full-scale jury trial-there 
do not appear to be any factual disputes concerning the foregoing recitation of the parties' 
dealings. There are no documents which are claimed to be ambiguously worded or whose 
authenticity is denied. There are no promises or representations which one side says the other 
made, the occurrence or even the particulars of which are in dispute. Given the established 
validity of the two Employment Contracts, as well as the undisputed facts that $35,000 was 
"deposit[ ed] or ... paid on account of purchase" of Defendants' land by the Harmons and that 
$450,000 was similarly "deposit[ed] or ... paid on account of purchase" of Defendants' land by 
MidAmerican but kept by Defendants (apart from the $22,500 Knipe received), it is difficult to 
see what viable defenses Defendants have left or what factual evidence they might present to the 
jury to justify denial of Knipe's demands or satisfy their own burden of proof to prevail on their 
Counterclaim. 
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Defendants may attempt to "explain" the factual and legal effect of the land purchase 
contracts they entered into with the Harmons and MidAmerican in an effort to show that the 
monies paid and then forfeited by one or both of those erstwhile purchasers of their land did not 
fall within the terms of the 2005 and 2007 Employment Contracts. However, Defendants do not 
claim that any of those contracts are ambiguous and thus in need of explanation by parole 
evidence. If a written agreement "'is complete upon its face and unambiguous, no fraud or 
mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or 
conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or detract from the terms ofthe 
written contract.'" Chambers v. Thomas, 123 Idaho 69, 72,844 P.2d 698,701 (1992) (citation 
omitted). The same prohibition applies to a witness testifying about his prior or 
contemporaneous "understanding of his obligations" under unambiguous contracts. Id. 
Defendants should not, therefore, be allowed to offer oral testimony to the effect that, for 
instance, the $35,000 paid by the Harmons was only deemed nonrefundable as consideration for 
an extension of the purchase agreement-as distinguished from the purchase price of the land 
itself-when the documents Defendants and the Harmons signed speak plainly for themselves. 
Similarly, Defendant should not be allowed to testify that any portion of the $450,000 paid by 
MidAmerican was "really" consideration for that prospective buyer's opportunity to inspect the 
land and thus could not be "forfeited" when MidAmerican terminated its purchase agreement. 
For that matter, Defendants should not be allowed to testify about what they believed to be the 
scope of the Employment Contracts' provision that "[s]hould a deposit or amounts paid on 
account of purchase [of their land] be forfeited" to claim that neither the Harmons' nor 
MidAmerican's payments or deposits were "forfeited" or otherwise paid in any manner that did 
not come within the reach of that provision. "Forfeited" is an ordinary and commonly 
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understood term and the circumstances under which the Harmons and MidAmerican paid their 
money-and then abandoned any claim to either have it refunded or applied to the purchase 
price of Defendants' real property-are sufficiently clear so that there should be no need for 
partisan witnesses to dissect such matters to the jury. 
The only other conceivable argument that Defendants may make, given the Court's prior 
rulings, is that Knipe's failure to demand one-half of the money paid and later forfeited by the 
Harmons until shortly before the commencement of this litigation constituted a waiver by Knipe 
of its entitlement to that money, and even more remotely, a waiver of its entitlement to one-half 
of the money paid by MidAmerican. However, the admitted facts make even this affirmative 
defense a dubious proposition. Knipe, which had held the Harmons' money in trust pending a 
closing of their purchase of Defendants' land, disbursed the $35,000 when Defendants and the 
Harmons agreed that sum was no longer subject to the purchase agreement's original 
contingency. But that was before the Harmons backed out of the deal. Once they did, it is 
agreed that neither Knipe nor Defendants affirmatively said or did anything concerning that 
money until just before this lawsuit began. 
A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right. Fullerton v. 
Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291,295 (2006) (citation omitted). "Waiver will not be 
inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting and intent to waive." Jones v. 
Maestas, 108 Idaho 69, 71, 696 P.2d 920,922 (Ct. App. 1985). See also Margaret H Wayne 
Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993). "Waiver is a mixed question of 
law and fact. A court first must determine whether the facts alleged to constitute waiver are true. 
The court then must decide whether these facts, as a matter of law, suffice to show waiver." 
Soloaga v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 678, 682, 809 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Ct. App. 1991). It will 
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therefore be for the Court to first decide whether the silence that followed the Harrnons' 
forfeiture of the earnest money they had paid to purchase ofMr. and Mrs. Robertson's land can 
support a submissible issue of waiver for the jury to consider. In making this determination, the 
Court must acknowledge that "[t]he doctrine of implied waiver by silence is disfavored" in Idaho 
(Seaport Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736,739,735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct. App. 1987)), 
and consequently reject this affirmative defense as a matter of law. 
Moreover, "the party asserting the waiver must 'show that he acted in reasonable reliance 
upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. '" Fullerton v. Griswold, 
142 Idaho at 824,136 P.3d at 295. The only "detriment" Defendants claim to have suffered by 
their unilateral equation of Knipe's silence to an intention to acquiesce to them keeping all of 
that money was their payment of state and federal income tax on the portion of the Harmons' 
forfeited money that should have gone to Knipe instead. The fact that Defendants paid taxes 
with money they were not entitled to in the first place, and then kept the balance of what was 
properly Knipe's, hardly constitutes a loss or detriment on their part. 
The Court's determination that the two Employment Contracts are valid and enforceable 
as a matter of law also neutralizes Defendants' Counterclaim to the extent it alleged violations of 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-603, 40-608. 
Defendants' Counterclaim also alleged that John Knipe, personally, "tortiously 
converted" the $22,500 both Knipe and Defendants authorized the escrow holder to disburse 
before MidAmerican terminated its purchase agreements. But Idaho does not recognize any tort 
for the conversion of money unless such monies are maintained in separately identifiable 
accounts. Warm Springs Props., Inc. v. Andorra Villa, Inc., 96 Idaho 270,272,526 P.2d 1106, 
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1108 (1974).3 It is agreed that the $22,500 sought by Defendants' Counterclaim was not kept in 
separate accounts, so this claim also fails as a matter of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Bluntly stated, it does not appear to Knipe that Defendants have any credible defenses to 
its claims. The Court has already rejected all of Defendants' legal objections to the 2005 and 
2007 Employment Contracts. The parole evidence rule will prevent Defendants from telling the 
jury what their contracts with Knipe, the Harmons, and MidAmerican "really" meant, because 
each of those documents is clear, complete, and unambiguous-and not even Defendants have 
argued otherwise. 
The undisputed facts show that both the Harmons and MidAmerican "deposit[ ed] or ... 
paid on account of purchase ofland," $35,000 and $450,000, respectively. Neither the facts nor 
the ordinary meaning of the words used in those contracts will permit any other conclusion but 
that such monies were forfeited by both erstwhile purchasers of Defendants' land when they 
elected to not go through with the purchase of Defendants' land. It therefore falls to Defendants 
to show that Knipe acted in some fashion that clearly indicated to them that it intended to 
voluntarily waive its contractual entitlement to these monies, and that Defendants additionally 
acted to their detriment in reliance on such conduct. But the only suggestion of a waiver cited by 
Defendants is Knipe's 18 month silence about the Harmons' forfeited money. Not only have 
Defendants failed to suggest any detrimental action taken in reliance on this silence, but the fact 
of silence, alone, is generally legally inadequate to support an affirmative defense of waiver. 
3 It is also undisputed that Mr. Knipe did not tortiously gain or wrongfully maintain 
control over this $22,500 since MidAmerican paid it to the escrow holder designated in its land 
purchase contracts with Defendants, First American Title Company, and not to Knipe. This 
money was only afterward disbursed to Knipe with Defendants' concurrence. 
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There will likely be only three testifying witnesses at the trial: John Knipe, Rowena 
Strain, and Richard Robertson. Their permissible testimony should be harmonious even though 
they are on opposite sides of this controversy. That testimony will simply confirm what the 
Court has already determined or which the parties agree to: that the parties entered into two 
valid and enforceable Employment Contracts; that monies were paid and forfeited by two 
prospective purchasers recruited by Knipe in the performance of those Employment Contracts; 
that Defendants refused to share the monies so forfeited in violation of those Employment 
Contracts; and, finally, that Knipe undertook no affirmative actions that would support a legally 
cognizable claim that it voluntarily waived its contractual entitlement to those monies. 
DATED: June/)'",2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
~~ 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Knipe 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 11,2009, I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF 
AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF (FILED UNDER SEAL) on the 
following, in the matter indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[vrVia Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Knipe 
PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF (FILED UNDER 
SEAL) -12 
Boise-221381.2 0010908- 00008 
08/18/2009 16:36 FAX 
Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoe1.com 
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101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
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Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
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COME NOW the parties hereto and, pursuant to the Court's Order of November 25, 
2008, stipulate to the following facts: 
1. Plaintiff Knipe Land Company was and remains an Idaho corporation with its 
principal place of business in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. Plaintiffs principal business is that of 
an agent and broker for the purchase and sale of agricultural and commercial real property in 
Idaho and adjoining states. Plaintiff was and remains licensed as a real estate broker in Idaho. 
2. Third Party Defendant John Knipe was and remains a real estate agent and broker 
licensed by the state of Idaho. He is Plaintiff's president. 
3. . Rowena Strain was and remains a real estate agent licensed by the state of Idaho. 
She was and remains employed by Plaintiff. 
4 Defendants Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson ("Mr. and Mrs. 
Robertson") were and remain husband and wife, domicHed in Payette County, Idaho. 
5. Defendant Robertson Kennels. Inc. (URobertson Kennels") was and remains an 
Idaho corporation with its only place of business in Payette County. Idaho. All of the stock of 
Robertson Kennels has been and is owned by Mr. and Mrs. Robertson and their son. 
6. Richard Robertson was and remains the president of Robertson Kennels, and had 
f'Ull authority to act on behalf of that corporation. 
7. Mr. and Mrs. Robertson own approximately 1400 acres of real property in Payette 
County. 
8. Robertson Kennels owns approximately 1887 acres of real property in Payette and 
Washington COW1ties. This land adjoins the land owned by Mr. and Mrs. Robertson in their 
individual names and the two parcels comprise a single contiguous property. 
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9. Mr. and Mrs. Robertson live on the property they and Robertson Kennels own and 
operate their fanning. hunting, and dog breeding and training businesses on it. 
10. On or about September 1,2005, Mr. and Mrs. Robertson entered into an 
"Employment Contract" with Plaintiff ("the 2005 Employment Contract") whereby Mr. and Mrs. 
Robertson granted Plaintiff an exclusive listing to sell the land they owned in their own names. 
11. On or about February 6, 2007, Richard Robertson, on behalf of Robertsons 
Kennels, entered into an "Employment Contractj , with Plaintiff (''the 2007 Employment 
Contract") whereby Robertson Kennels granted Plaintiff an exclusive listing to sell the land own 
in Robenson Kennels I own name. 
12. With the execution of the 2007 Employment Contract, all of the real property 
owned by Defendants was listed for sale with Plaintiff. 
13. On or about November 1,2005, Plaintiff found potential buyers for Mr. and Mrs. 
Robertson'S land: Robert and Sheila Harmon ("the Harmons"). The Hannons signed a purchasc~ 
contract and paid $SO,OOO as earnest money which was held in Harmon's real estate broker's 
trust account. 
14. Under the tenns of the purchase agreement the Humons signed, their purchase of 
Mr. and Mrs. Robertson's land was conditioned on the Harmons selling property they already 
owned. Therefore, if the Harmons could not sell their property. they were not obligated to go 
forward with the purchase of Mr. and Mrs. Robertson's property and would be entitled to the 
return of the $50,000 they originally deposited on account of purchase. 
15. After the purchase contract was signed, Mr. and Mrs. Robertson and the Hannom 
agreed that $35,000 of the $50,000 originally paid by the Harmons would be considered 
nonrefundable and would not be returned to them even if they could not sell the propeny they 
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already owned, but all of that money would be credited to the purchase price of Mr. and Mrs. 
Robertson's land if the Hannons completed their purchase of it. The purchase price of Mr. and 
Mrs, Robertson's land was increased accordingly. 
16. When the Harmons agreed that $35,000.00 of the money they had paid would be 
deemed nonrefundable, Plaintiff disbursed that $35,000.00 to Mr. and Mrs. Robertson from 
Plaintiff's trust account as soon as the $35,000.00 was received from Hannon's real estate broker 
by Plaintiff. 
17. The Harmons could not sell their property and terminated their agreement to 
purchase Mr. and Mrs. Robertson's land on August 18,2006, after their $35,000 had been 
disbursed to Mr. and Mrs. Robertson. Mr, and Mrs. Robertson retained the $35,000. The 
remaining $15,000 in earnest money paid by Harmons was returned to Harmons. 
18. Plaintiff did not demand any ponion of the Hannons' $35,000 from Mr. and Mrs. 
Robertson until April 2, 2008. 
19. In September 2007, Plaintiff found a new third party that offered to purchase all 
of Defendants' real property, MidAmerican Nuclear Energy Company, LLC ("MidAmerican"), 
20. On or about September 24, 2007, Defendants and MidAmerican entered into an 
ilAgreement Sell and Purchase" to purchase Defendants' land for $6 million. 
21. On or about October 24.2007, Defendants and MidAmerican entered into three 
separate "Sell and Purchase Agreements," which. together, provided for the purchase all of 
Defendants' land in a single transaction. These three agreements replaced the September 24, 
2007 "Sell and Purchase Agreement." 
22. Prior to January 25,2008, MidAmerican paid a total of $450,000 in three (3) 
separate installments which. was deposited with the closing agent, First American Title 
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Company. MidAmerican agreed that the $450,000.00 was nonrefundable. If MidAmerican 
acquired Defendants' land, that money would be credited against the $6 million purchase price. 
Conversely, ifMidAmerican did not go through with the purchase of Defendants' land, 
MidAmerican was not be entitled to get any of that money back. 
23. The closing agent, First American Title Company, disbursed all but $22,500 of 
the $450,000 paid by MiciAmerican, to Defendants prior to Junuary 25, 2008. The closing agent 
disbursed the $22,500 to Plaintiff at the same time it made the disbursements to Defendants. 
24. On January 25,2008, MidAmerican told Defendants that it was terminating the 
Agreement to Sell and Purchase it had entered into with Defendants. 
25. Defendants have retained all of the money paid by the Hannons and $427,500.00 
paid by MidAmerican. 
26. Plaintiff has made demand on Defendants for one-half of the $35,000 paid by the 
Harmons. Plaintiff has also made demand on Defendants for one-half of the $450,000 of the 
money paid by the third-party purchaser in 2007, less the $22,500 that was previously disbursed 
to Plaintiff. 
27. Defendants have denied that Plaintiff is entitled to any share of the monies paid 
by the Hannons or the third-party purchaser for the purchase of their land. 
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DATED: June I' ,2009, 
DATED: June~2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
1ennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~/?~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND 
COMPANY AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN KNIPE'S PROPOSED 
STIPULATION OF FACTS (FILED UNDER SEAL) on the following, in the matter 
indicated below on this ;, day of June 2009. 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attomey for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[~Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] ViaEmail 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
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Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@Stoel.com 
STOEL RlVES Ll., 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389·9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Plaintiff'Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe, by and through 
their Wldersigned counsel, respectfully submits to the Court the attached Proposed Jwy 
Instructions No.1 through ~ pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 51 (a). 
DATBD: June 1'.2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
J ennife,. M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have served a OOPY of the foregoing PLAINTIFF 
THIRDIP ARTY DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS on the following, 
in the matter indicated below on this I £, day of June 2009. 
Derek A. Piga. PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Errwil: dere/q'Jica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[ ~ia Facsimile 
[ ) Via Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
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Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. R.einhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COME NOW Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third-Party Defendant John Knipe, by 
and through their counsel of record Stoel Rives LLP, and hereby submit the following list of 
potential witnesses who may be called to testify at the trial of this matter: 
1. Richard Robertson 
2. John Knipe 
3. Rowena Strain 
Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe reserve the right tc' 
call as a witness any other witness indentified by any party to this action or any individual who 
has been identified by any party during discovery in this matter, Plaintiff Knipe Land Company 
and Third Party Defendant John Knipe reserve the right to amend, add to, or delete from this list 
of witnesses. 
DATED: June 16,2009. 
STOEL R1VES LI.P 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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the following. in the matter indicated below on this ~ day of June, 2009. 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[""fVia Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
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Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff I Third Party Defendant 
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FORM .. ! 
Boise-22' 424 , I 00 1090S'()o008 /'-181 
~ 003/008 
0611812009 14: 13 FAX 
Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe, by and through 
their undersigned counsel, respectfully submits to the Court the attached proposed SPECIAL 
VERDICT form. 
DATED: June!i, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF TmRDIP ARTY DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM·2 
Bohic:.221424.1 0010908-00008 
06/18/2009 14:13 FAX 
III 004/006 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June I' ,2009, I served a copy of the foregOing PLAINTIFF 
TmRDIP ARTY DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM on the 
following, in the matter indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[ '"i"\'ia Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] ViaEmail 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF THIRDIP ARTY DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM - 3 II I. O!2 
8oise-221424.10010908wO0008 ..,. 0 ~ 
06/18/2009 14:13 FAX 
TN THE DISTRICT COUR.T OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 




RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third P Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the ju:ry~ answer the special verdict as follows: 
If you find for Plaintiff, please answer Question No.1, but do not answer Question 
No.2: 
~ 005/006 
Question No.1: What is owed Plaintiff by Defendants under the provisions of the 2005 and 
2007 Employment Contracts? 
Answer to Question No.1: $ _____ _ 
08/18/2008 14:13 FAX Itl 008/008 
If you do not find for Plaintiff, but additionally find for Defendants on their 
Counterclaim. please answer Question No.2: 
Question No.2: What IS owed Defendants by Plaintiff under the 2005 and 20C 7 
Employment Contracts? 
Answer to Question No.2: $ ______ _ 
Foreman 
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302 
BOISE,ID 83702 
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144 
FACSIMILE: (208) 336-4980 
IDAHO STATE BAR No. 3559 
ATTORNEY FOR Defendants 
FILED 
TH~F10 JUD:;':~!J~L O;STntc-i' C~JUR f 
Payetl& C~~uni). ;Us,l!}() 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 






RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and ) 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and ) 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., ) 
an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and ) 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and ) 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., ) 
an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 




JOHN KNIPE, an individual, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
--------------------------~) 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTS' 
WITNESS LIST 
COME NOW, the above-named Defendants / Counterclaimants / Third Party 
Plaintiffs, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson, husband and wife; and 
DEFENDANTS' WITNESS LIST - Page 1 
Robertson Kennels, Inc., by and through their attorney of record, Derek A. Pica, and 
respectfully submit to the Court the witnesses they intend to call at the trial of the above-
entitled matter: 
Richard A. Robertson 





DATED this I~ day of June, 2009. 
Derek A. Pica 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the /0~ay of June, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' WITNESS LIST to be forwarded with all 
required charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Rules 





Mark S. Geston 
STOEL RIVES, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise,ID 83702 
/ 
Derek A. Pica 
DEFENDANTS' WITNESS LIST - Page 2 
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302 
BOISE,ID 83702 
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144 
FACSIMILE: (208) 336-4980 
IDAHO STATE BAR No. 3559 
ATTORNEY FOR Defendants 
-----------~~~ 
FILED I 
T!-1IRD JUD;C1A,. DiSTRICT COUHT ' 
P¥iG';' {~;,un;y. Idaho 
JUN 1,.~ 2009 PM 
____ .~ ___ f'\-.;\j".,_~. _______ • • 
Bv , Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 






RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and ) 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and ) 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., ) 
an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and ) 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and ) 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., ) 
an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 




JOHN KNIPE, an individual, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
PROPOSED VERDICT 
[FILED UNDER SEAL] 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED VERDICT - Page 1 
l'fi8 
COME NOW, Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson and 
Robertson Kennels, Inc., and respectfully submits the attached requested jury 
instructions, numbered 1 through 30, and the attached proposed verdict. 
-;:("'11 
DATEDthis I~ dayofJune2009. bJ ( ~ 
Derek A. Pica 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the If' ~ay of June, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
PROPOSED VERDICT to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the methodes) 






Mark S. Geston 
STOEL RIVES, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
7 
/ 
Derek A. Pica 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURy INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED VERDICT - Page 2 
ItI:~' 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to 
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these 
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be 
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on 
sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and 
it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a 
whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions 
are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the 
importance of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note 
to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this 
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into 
evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the 
attorneys may help you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say 
is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you 
should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during 
the trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer 
it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal 
matters, and are solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any 
objection, which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may 
not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit 
would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only 
as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or 
the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or 
remark be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it 
from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, 
but must treat it as though you had never heard it. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course 
of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you 
believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is no magical 
formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves 
whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are 
told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your 
everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in 
this case. 
IDJI1.00 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED --------
COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER ---------------
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby 
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and 
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end ofthe trial. 
IDJI 1.01 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED --------
MODIFIED ______ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER --------
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. L 
The corporations involved in this care are entitled to the same fair and 
unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You 




REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER~ __________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or 
their employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss 
the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your 
decision in the case, you must report it to me promptly. 
3 . You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury 
room to deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony 
and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5 . You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
IDJI1.03 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED -------
MODIFIED _______ _ 
COVERED -------
OTHER ____________ _ 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION No.5" --
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among 
yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until 
after I finally submit the case to you. 
IDJI1.03.1 
GIVEN --------
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER ____________ _ 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I 
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be 
decided. 
IDJI 1.05 
GIVEN -------REFUSED __________ _ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ----------OTHER _________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.l 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, and Defendants, Richard A. Robertson 
and Johnnie L. Robertson, entered into an Employment Contract on September 1,2005 
whereby Knipe Land Company was employed to sell real property owned by Defendants, 
Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson. 
2. On January 1,2005, Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. 
Robertson, entered into a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement with Robert E. 
Harmon and Sheila A. Harmon (Harmon Contract) to sell Defendants', Richard A. 
Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson's real property they owned in Payette County. 
Closing was to occur on February 15,2006. 
3. The Harrnons' duty to purchase Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson's real property was contingent upon Harmons being able to sell real 
property Harmons owned in Eagle, Idaho. 
4. Harrnons paid earnest money in the amount of $50,000.00 to their realtor's 
trust account. 
5. Harmons were unable to sell their real property before February 15,2006 
and requested an extension. 
6. On February 15,2006, Harrnons and Defendants, Richard A. Robertson 
and Johnnie L. Robertson, entered into an agreement extending the closing to March 15, 
2006. Pursuant to the February 15,2006 agreement, $25,000.00 of the earnest money 
deposited by Harmons became non-refundable and Harrnons' realtor mailed to Plaintiff, 
Knipe Land Company, a check from their trust account in the amount of$25,000.00 on 
February 21,2006 made payable to Knipe Land Company's real estate trust account. 
7. On February 24, 2006, Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, mailed a check in 
the amount of $25,000.00 from its real estate trust account to Defendants, Richard A. 
Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson. 
8. On May 15,2006, Harmons and Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson, entered into an agreement extending the closing to August 15, 
2006. Pursuant to the May 15,2006 agreement, $10,000.00 of the earnest money 
deposited by Harmons became non-refundable and Harmons' realtor mailed to Knipe 
Land Company a check from their trust account in the amount of $1 0,000.00 on May 17, 
2006 made payable to Knipe Land Company's real estate trust account. 
9. On May 19,2006, Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, mailed a check in the 
amount of $10,000.00 from its real estate trust account to Defendant, Richard A. 
Robertson. 
10. Harmons were unable to sell their real property located in Eagle, Idaho 
and on August 18, 2006 Harmons and Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. 
Robertson entered into a Notice to Terminate Contract and Release of Earnest Money. 
The remaining $15,000.00 of earnest money was returned to the Harmons. 
11. Harmons did not breach the Purchase and Sale Agreement they entered 
into with Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson. 
12. Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, did not request one-half of the non-
refundable earnest money paid by Harmons to Defendants, Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson until April 2, 2008. 
13. Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company and Defendant, Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
entered into an Employment Contract on February 6, 2007 whereby Knipe Land 
Company was employed to sell real property owned by Defendant, Robertson Kennels, 
Inc. 
14. On September 24,2007, MidAmerican and Defendants entered into an 
Agreement to Sell and Purchase whereby MidAmerican agreed to purchase Defendants' 
real property located in Payette and Washington Counties for the purchase price of 
$6,000,000.00 contingent upon MidAmerican finding Defendants' real property suitable 
for building a nuclear power plat. 
15. On September 26,2007, MidAmerican paid to an escrow account at First 
American Title Company $150,000.00 in non-refundable earnest money. On September 
26,2007, Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, instructed First American Title Company 
to pay to Defendants the sum of$150,000.00, less 5% that Plaintiff, Knipe Land 
Company kept as a commission. 
16. On October 23,2007, MidAmerican paid to an escrow account at First 
American Title Company $150,000.00 in non-refundable earnest money. On October 23, 
2007, Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, instructed First American Title Company to 
pay to Defendants the sum of$150,000.00, less 5% that Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, 
kept as a commission. 
17. On December 18,2007, MidArnerican paid to an escrow account at First 
American Title Company $150,000.00 in non-refundable earnest money. On December 
18,2007, Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, instructed First American Title Company 
to pay to Defendants the sum of$150,000.00, less 5% that Plaintiff, Knipe Land 
Company kept as a commission. 
18. On January 25,2008, MidAmerican, pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreements to Sell and Purchase it had entered into with Defendants, elected to terminate 
the Agreements to Sell and Purchase and not proceed with purchasing Defendants' real 
property. 
19. MidAmerican did not breach the Agreements to Sell and Purchase it 
entered into with Defendants. 
IDJI 1.07 
GIVEN ______ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------
COVERED __________ ~ 
OTHER. ____________ _ 
1500 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you 
may send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to 
communicate with me by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on 




REFUSED __________ _ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER __________ _ 
lSD/ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. _Cf_ 
I have given you the rules oflaw that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. 
In a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will 
retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, 
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At 
the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic 
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be 
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are 
not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after 
a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
IDJI 1.13 
GIVEN ----------------
REFUSED ________ _ 
MODIFIED _____ _ 
COVERED _______ _ 
OTHER. __________ _ 
150~ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least 
three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of 
each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view 
to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. 
Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial 
consideration of the evidence with your fellowjurors. In the course of your deliberations, 
do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced it is 
erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of 
evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of 
returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is 
to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
IDJI 1.13.1 
GIVEN ----------------
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER~ __________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. II --
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use 
only the ones conforming to your conclusions and return the others unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If you 
verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than 
the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, 
who will then return you into open court. 
IDJI 1.15.1 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ------
MODIFIED ________ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER '----------
J5Dtf 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11-
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the 
proposition is more probably true than not true. 
IDJI 1.20.1 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ------MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER C---______ _ 
1505 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that 
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, 
by proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the 
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
IDJI 1.24.2 
GIVEN --------
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED -------
OTHER _________ _ 
}S()" 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
In this case, Defendants allege that the Employment Contracts did not have a 
lawful purpose. 
The purpose for which the contracts were made, and the actions or non-actions 
expected of the parties in order to perform under the contracts, must all be lawful when 
the contracts were made. 
IDJI 6.03.1 
GIVEN --------
REFUSED ________ _ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ------
OTHER~ _______ _ 
/5D7 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. I~ --
A provision in the Employment Contracts entered into by Plaintiff and 
Defendants states: 
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall find 
a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price and 
terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, .. , I hereby agree to 
pay you in cash for your services a commission equal in amount to 5 
percent of said selling price. 
This provision violates public policy and is unenforceable. In the state ofIdaho, a 
real estate broker does not earn a commission until the purchaser completes the 
transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the contract. 
Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 257, 846 P.2d 904 (1993). 
GIVEN --------
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------
COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER. ____________ _ 
/508 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. J1L 
Certain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable. If such a contract exists 
but is not in writing, this does not mean that there is no contract, or that it is illegal or 
improper, it simply means that the contract may not be enforced in court. 
IDJI 6.06.4 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ------
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER -------
15()Cj 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The terms of the contracts are in dispute as to the following provision: 
Should a deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, 
one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the broker, as the balance shall 
be paid to me. The broker's share of any forfeited deposit or amounts paid 
on account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contracts in 
this case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the 
following: 
1. The contracts must be construed as a whole, including all of the 
circumstances giving rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the 
evidence that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties 
showing what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be 
considered, provided that such may not completely change the agreement or construe one 
term inconsistently with the remainder of the terms. 
4. The contracts should be construed to avoid any contradiction or 
absurdities. 
Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to 
any generally known and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find 
from the evidence that this was not intended. 
/510 
IDJI 6.08.1 
GIVEN _____ _ 
REFUSED -----
MODIFIED ___ _ 
COVERED -----
OTHER~ _____ _ 
lSI J 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
A "forfeit" is to lose in consequence of breach of contract. 
Black's Law Dictionary 332 (5 th ed. 1983) 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED -------COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER _________ _ 
15/~ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by 
any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the 
written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written 
agreement. While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an 
ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely change the agreement, or 
to construe a term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other, 
non-ambiguous terms or parts. 
IDJI 6.08.2 
GIVEN ______ _ 
REFUSED _________ _ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER _________ _ 
15/3 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1.fJ 
When there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the true intent of the 
parties cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved in 
interpreting the contract against the party who drafted the contract or provided the 
ambiguous language. 
IDJI 6.08.3 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER. ____________ _ 
)514 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. "ll --
A contract may be amended or modified by an agreement of the parties. This 
requires all of the elements of any other contract. 
IDJI 6.09.1 
GIVEN -------
REFUSED __________ _ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ------
OTHER _________ _ 
/5/5 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. -.:J:L 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendant; 
2. The Defendants breached the contract; 
3. The Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the Plaintiff has been proved, then you must consider the issue of 
the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this 
instruction has not been proved, your verdict should be for the Defendants. 
IDII6.10.1 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER --------
/51b 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. --.bi 
In this case the Defendants have asserted certain affirmative defenses. The 
Defendants have the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
Defendants' affirmative defenses are as follows: 
1. Any alleged claim Plaintiff has against Defendants for breach of contract 
has been waived by Plaintiff. 
2. Division of earnest monies are controlled under Idaho law by offers to 
purchase and therefore, the Employment Contracts are unenforceable in regard to 
division of earnest monies. 
3. In the offers to sell and purchase defendants entered into with 
MidAmerican, Plaintiff agreed that Defendants were entitled to all earnest monies. 
4. Plaintiffs claims are barred by estoppel. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the Defendant have been proved, then your verdict should be for 
the defense. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the 
propositions has not been proved, then the Defendants have not proved the affirmative 
defense in this case. 
IDJI 6.10.4 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED _____ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER _________ _ 
1~/7 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. A 
The defendant has raised the defense of waiver by estoppel. This is a legal term 
which means that a party is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by 
reason of the party's own conduct. To establish the defense of waiver by estoppel, the 
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff represented to the defendant by words or conduct or by 
silence when a duty to speak and protest the action of the defendant existed that plaintiff 
was waiving, excusing or forgiving the defendant's breach of contract; and 
2. The defendant relied upon this representation and materially changed 
position in reliance thereon; and 
3. The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and 
4. The change of position was to the defendant's detriment. 
If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that 
the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff for the claimed breach of contract. If the 
defendant fails to prove all of the propositions, the defendant has not established the 
affirmative defense of estoppel. 
IDJI6.22.2 
GIVEN ______ _ 
REFUSED ------
MODIFIED ------COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER '---------
151e 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1,.t:j 
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by 
conduct, by words, or by acquiescence. 
IDJI 6.24.1 
GIVEN ______ _ 
REFUSED ________ _ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER _________ _ 
/51t::t 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. A 
A real estate broker has the following duties to its clients under Idaho law: 
1. To make certain that all offers to purchase real property are in writing and 
contain a provision for division of earnest money retained by any person as forfeited 
payment should the translation not close. 
2. To rely on the terms of the purchase and sale agreement or other written 
documents signed by both parties to determine how to disburse disputed earnest money. 
3. To promote the best interests of the client in good faith, honesty and fair 
dealing including, but not limited to: 
(a) Disclosing to the client all adverse material facts actually known or which 
reasonably should have been known by the licensee; 
(b) Seeking a buyer to purchase the seller's property at a price, and under terms 
and conditions acceptable to the seller and assisting in the negotiation therefore. 
Idaho Code § 54-2051 (4)(e) and § 54-2046(5) 
Idaho Code § 54-2047 
Idaho Code § 54-2087(4)(a) & (b) 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ------




DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. n 
Third Party Plaintiffs, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson and 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. have the burden of proving each of the following propositions on 
their conversion claim against Third Party Defendant, John Knipe: 
1. That the Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, kept Third Party Plaintiffs' 
$22,500.00 without a right to do so; 
2. The nature and extent of the damages to Third Party Plaintiffs and the 
amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for the Third Party Plaintiffs; 
but, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions 
has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the Third Party Defendant. 
IDJI4.50 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED _______ _ 




DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. A 
If the jury decides that the Third Party Plaintiffs, Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. are entitled to recover from the Third 
Party Defendant, John Knipe, the jury may consider the following damages: 
If the property is not returned, the Third Party Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the 
fair market value of the property taken; and 
The Third Party Plaintiffs may recover the reasonable costs and expenses incurred 
in connection with Third Party Defendant taking the property and in connection with 
Third Party Plaintiffs' attempts to recover the property. These expenses are now, 
however, to include the court costs or attorney fees incurred in this litigation. 
IDJI9.11 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------
COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER~ __________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
A real estate broker licensed in the state of Idaho is required to deposit all funds 
that broker receives, including earnest money, in a real estate trust account maintained by 
the broker at an approved depository. 
Further, no disbursement of any portion of the broker's commission shall take 
place without prior written, signed authorization from the buyer and seller and until the 
buyer or seller has been paid the amount due as determined by the closing statement. 
Idaho Code §§ 54-2045(1) and 54-2046(4) 
GIVEN ______ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER~ ________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Defendants / Counterclaimaints / Third Party Plaintiffs, Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. have the following burden of proving 
the following propositions on their claim that Counterdefendant, Knipe Land Company 
and Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by: 
1. Failing to deliver to Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, Inc. legible 
copies of the Employment Contracts at the time Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, 
Inc's signatures were obtained. 
2. Engaging in any act or practice which was otherwise misleading, false or 
deceptive to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
3. Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice when providing 
real estate services to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
Idaho Code §§ 48-602(2) and 48-603(13), (17) and (18). 
GIVEN --------
REFUSED ____ _ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED ______ __ 
OTHER~ __________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' 
REQUESTED VERDICT FORM 
QUESTION NO.1: Did the Defendants breach the Employment contracts they entered 
into with Plaintiff? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 1: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 4. If you answered this question 
"yes," then continue to the next question. 
QUESTION NO.2: Did the Defendants prove anyone of their affirmative defenses? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.2: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "no," then continue to the next question. If you answered 
this questions "yes," then go to Question 4. 
QUESTION NO.3: What are Plaintiff's damages? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.3: Amount: $ _______ _ 
QUESTION NO.4: Did the Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, convert $22,500.00 
belonging to Defendants / Counterclaimants / Third Party Plaintiffs' for his own use? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 4: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "no," you are done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and 
advise the bailiff. If you answered this question "yes," continue to the next question. 
QUESTION NO.5: What are Defendants / Counterclaimants / Third Party Plaintiffs 
damages? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.5: Amount: $ -------------------------
You are now done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff. 
Dated this ___ day of June, 2009. 
FOREMAN 
J5~b 
08/18/2009 18:54 FAX ~ 002/008 
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RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC.) 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY 
AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
JOHN KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN 
KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST .. 1 , .. " 7 
8018e.220611.7 00 I 0908·00008 ~ ~ 
06/18/2009 18:54 FAX III 003/008 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third-Party Defendant John Knipe, 
by and through their counsel of record. Stoel Rives LLP, and hereby submit the following list of 
potential exhibits anticipated to be used at the trial of the instant matter: 
EX DESCRIPTION DATE BATES # 
# 
1. Map of Little Willow Creek Property KLC01928 
2. Map of Defendants , Real Property RS0038 
3. Legal description of Defendants' Real KLC01646-S0 
Property 
4. Employment Contract 911105 RSOOI-2 
5. Records of Payette County Recorder for Tax PCCOOl-43 
Parcels ##7784, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2404, 
2457,2458, and 7777 
6. Purchase and Sale Agreement - Harmon lllI/05 KLC02170-74 
7. Harmon Purchase Agreement - Addendum 1 1111/05 KLC02159 
8. Harmon Purchase Agreement - Addenda 2 1126/06 KLC02206-7 
and 3 ($25)000) 
9. Check from Knipe Land to Robertson .. 2/24/06 KLC02237 
$25,000 
10. RE II - Addendum 7 ($10,000) 5/9/06 KLC02281 
11. Check from Knipe Land to Robertson- 5119/06 KLC02294 
$10,000 
12. Email from Robertson to Strain re extension to 8/8/06 RSOO40 
Harmon contract 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND TIDRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN 
KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST - 2 I r~g 
Boise.22061 1.7 00]0908·0000& CJ I 
06/16/2008 16:54 FAX ~ 004/008 
.-
EX DESCRIPTION DATE BATES # 
# .-
13. Notice to Terminate Contract (Harmon) 8/18/06 KLC02310 
14. Letter from Knipe Land with Contract 9/29/06 KLC02003-4 
Renewal (through 611107) 
15. Letter with Little Willow Ranch Brochure 12/19/06 KLC2018·21 
16. Email from Robertson to Strain ~ Ust the 1/12/07 KLC01521 
whole ranch 
17. Employment Contract (Robertson Kennels, 2/6/07 KLCOlS05-7 
Inc. Property) .. 
18. MLS Status Change Form - $6,000,000 3/22/07 KLC01519 
19. MLS Status Change Form - $2,500,000 3/22/07 KLCOIS20 
20. Maps of Defendants' Real Property 4119/07 KLC01927 
KLC02102 
KLC 02103 
21. Marketing Information prepared by Plaintiff 4/19/07 KLC01788-
and Reviewed by Defendant Richard 01794 
Robertson 
22. Marketing Information prepared by Plaintiff KLC01795-
and Reviewed by Defendant Richard 01801 
Robertson 
23. Marketing Information prepared by Plaintiff KLC02097-
and Reviewed by Defendant Richard 02103 
Robertson 
24. Letter from Robertson with Contract Renewal 5123/07 RS0036-37 
(through J 2/1/07) 
25. Employment Contract Renewals for 8/24/07 KLCO 1963-66 
Defendants' Real Property 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN 
KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST· 3 I ~~~ 
QQisc-22061 1.7 0010908·00008 ;..14 I 
06/16/2009 16:55 FAX !gJ 005/008 
.-
EX DESCRIPTION DATE BATES # 
1# 
26. Agreement to Sell and Purchase 9/24/07 
.-
27. Counter Offer to Agreement to Sell and 9/24/07 KLC00614-15 
Purchase 
28. Instructions to Escrow - First American Title 9/26/07 FATCO-041 
Co. ($75,0001 $75,000) 
.-
29. Agreement to Sell and Purchase - Kennel 10/22/07 Bjorkman Aff. 
Ranch Ex. 
30. Agreement to Sell and Purchase - Robertson 10/22/07 Bjorkman Aff. 
Residence Ex. 
.. 
31. Agreement to Sell and Purchase - Little 10/22/07 Bjorkman Af£. 
Willow Ranch Ex. 
32. Instructions to Escrow - First American Title 10/23/07 FATCO-038 
Co. ($75,0001 $75,000) 
33. Escrow instructions to First American Title 12/17/07 KLCOOO83-84 
Co. ($75,0001 $75,000) 
.. 
34. Instruotions to Escrow - First American Title 12/18/07 FATCO-039 
Co. ($75,000 1 $75,000) 
35. Letter from Richard Robertson to Amy 12/18/07 FATCO-110 
Bishop, at First American Title Co. 
36. Amendment to Agreements to Sell and 12/20/07 KLCOOO73-76 
Purchase (all 3 properties) 
37. Second Amendment to Agreements to Sell and 1/21108 FATCO-l11-14 
Purchase (all 3 properties) 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN 
KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST - 4 15'30 
Boisc-220611. 7 00 I 0908..00008 
06/18/2008 16:55 FAX IgJ 006/008 
.-
EX DESCRIPTION DATE BATES # 
# .-
38. Termination Letter 1125108 KLC02313-14 
.~ 
39. Letter from Knipe to Robertson re 1/2 2/19/08 KLC01867 
forfeited money 
.-
40. Letter from Knipe to Robertson re terms of 2/27/08 I<LCOI8S9 
agreement 
41. Defendants Richard and Johnnie Robertson's 2006 T AXBSOO 1-22 
2006 Tax Returns 
.-
42. Defendant Robertson Kennels' 2006 Tax 2006 T AXES023-59 
Return 
43. Defendants Richard and Johnnie Robertson's 2007 T AXES060-93 
2007 Tax Returns 
.-
44. Defendant Robertson Kennels' 2007 Tax 2007 T AXES094-126 
Return 
45. Alonso Becker Ranch Brochure 1997 KLC02315 
46. Richard Robertson Affidavit 12/31108 
.. 
47. Richard Robertson Affidavit 5/7/09 
48. Mortgage - #271969 (Robertsons) 1/15/98 KLC02316-27 
., 
49. Mortgage - #271970 (Robertson Kennels, 1115/98 KLC02328-39 
Inc.) 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant reserve the right t() introduce as an exhibits any 
exhibit identified by Defendants and/or Third-Party Plaintiffs in this action and any document 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND TWRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN 
KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST - S 15'~ I 
Boise.220611.7 0010908-00008 V 
08/16/2008 16:55 FAX 
produced by any party during discovery in the instant matter. Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant reserve the right to amend, add to, or delete from this list of potential exhibits. 
DATED: June Ie. t 2009, 
STOEL RIVES I.LP 
ark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN 
KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST - 6 /53;2-Boisc-220611 ,7 0010908-00008 
~ 007/008 
06/16/2009 18:55 FAX 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on June..&..-. 2009, I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN KNIPE'S 
EXHIBIT LIST on the following, in the matter indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[ '1" Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ J Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
Mark S, Geston 
JeIUlifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for PlaintifflThird Party Defendant 
PLAINTIFF KNIPE LAND COMPANY AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT JOHN 
KNIPE'S EXHIBIT LIST - 7 
Soisc-220611.7 001 O!l08-O0008 1553 
ltJ 008/008 
DEREKA. PICA, PLLC 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
199 N. CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 302 
BOISE,ID 83702 
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-4144 
FACSIMILE: (208) 336-4980 
IDAHO STATE BARNo. 3559 
ATTORNEY FOR Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 






RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and ) 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and ) 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., ) 
an Idaho Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and ) 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and ) 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., ) 
an Idaho Co~oration, ) 
) 




JOHN KNIPE, an individual, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTS' I COUNTER-
CLAIMANTS' I THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF 
[FILED UNDER SEAL] 
COME NOW, the above-named Defendants / Counterc1aimants / Third Party 
Plaintiffs, Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson, husband and wife, hereinafter 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
Pagel 158+ 
"Robertsons," and Robertson Kennels, Inc., hereinafter "Robertson Kennels," and 
pursuant to the Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial filed on November 25,2008, 
respectfully file with the Court Defendants' Trial Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 1,2005, Plaintiff, Knipe Land Company, hereinafter 
"Knipe Land" and Robertsons entered into an Employment Contract wherein Knipe Land 
agreed to act as a real estate broker on behalf of Robertsons to sell land owned by 
Robertsons consisting of approximately 1,400 acres. 
2006. 
2. The 2005 Employment Contract provided in part: 
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall find 
a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price and 
terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, or that during your 
employment you place me into contact with a buyer to or through whom at 
any time within 180 days after termination of said employment, I may sell 
or convey said property, I hereby agree to pay you in cash for your 
services a commission equal in amount to 7 percent of said selling price. 
Should a deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, 
one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the broker, as the balance shall 
be paid to me. The broker's share of any forfeited deposit or amounts paid 
on account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission. 
(Emphasis added). 
3. The 2005 Employment Contract had an expiration date of September 1, 
4. On or about November 1,2005, Robertsons and Robert E. & Sheila N. 
Harmon, hereinafter "Harmons," entered into a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement 
whereby Harmons agreed to purchase a parcel of real property from Robertsons for Two 
Million Four Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars contingent upon Harmons 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
Page 2 
being able to sell a certain parcel of real property and paid $50,000.00 in earnest money 
to their real estate broker. (Emphasis added). 
5. Harmons paid to Robertsons non-refundable earnest money totaling 
$35,000.00 from the $50,000.00, all of which was made non-refundable in consideration 
of Robert sons agreeing to extend the closing dates two (2) times because Harmons were 
unable to sell their real property. 
6. Knipe Land paid the $35,000.00 to Robertsons from its trust account. 
$25,000.00 was paid at the time of the first extension and $10,000.00 at the time of the 
second extension. 
7. On or about August 18,2006, Harmons and Robertsons entered into a 
Notice to Terminate Contract and Release of Earnest Money whereby the remaining 
$15,000.00 of earnest money was returned to Harmons. 
8. Harmons did not breach the terms of the Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement they entered into with Robertsons as Harmons' contingency of selling their 
real property, so they would have funds to purchase Robertsons' real property, was never 
met. 
9. Knipe Land did not request one-half of the earnest money paid by 
Harmons until April 2, 2008 after the MidAmerican deal was terminated. 
10. On February 6, 2007, Knipe Land and Defendant, Richard A. Robertson 
as President of Robertson Kennels entered into an Employment Contract wherein Knipe 
Land agreed to act as a real estate broker on behalf of Robertson Kennels to sell land 
owned by Robertson Kennels consisting of approximately 1,886 acres. At the time 
Defendant, Richard A. Robertson entered into the Employment Contract on behalf of 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
Page 3 
Robertson Kennels, he was unaware that Knipe Land intended to make a claim to one-
half of the earnest money paid by Harmons. The Employment Contract had the same 
commission and earnest money language as the 2005 Employment Contract except that 
the rate was 5%. The expiration date was June 1, 2007. 
11. On September 24, 2007, Defendants entered into an Agreement to Sell and 
Purchase with MidAmerican whereby MidAmerican agreed to purchase Defendants' real 
property contingent upon MidAmerican finding the Defendants' real property suitable for 
construction of a nuclear power plant. The purchase price was $6,000,000.00 and 
MidAmerican agreed to pay non-refundable earnest money in the amount of $700,000.00 
in installments. MidAmerican paid the first three (3) installments in the amount of 
$150,000.00 each totaling $450,000.00. The last installment of $250,000.00 was due on 
January 25,2008 by 5:00 p.m. Ofthe $450,000.00 paid by MidAmerican, $22,500.00 
(5%) was paid to Knipe Land as part of Knipe Land's anticipated commission. All 
monies paid to Defendants were at the direction of Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, 
broker for Knipe Land. 
12. From September 24, 2007 until MidArnerican terminated the Agreements 
to Sell and Purchase, MidAmerican had complete access to Defendants' real property. 
13. On January 25,2008, MidAmerican terminated the Agreements to Sell 
and Purchase based upon contingencies contained in the Agreements to Sell and Purchase 
and did not pay the last earnest money installment in the amount of $250,000.00. 
14. On February 11,2008, Robertsons requested that Knipe Land return the 
$22,500.00 that was paid to Knipe Land from the non-refundable earnest monies. Knipe 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
Page 4 
1537 
Land refused to return the money and instead of keeping the monies in its trust account, 
paid the money to John Knipe and Rowena Strain. 
15. On February 19,2008, Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, sent a letter to 
Robertsons requesting one-half ofthe $450,000.00 paid by MidAmerican less the 
$22,500.00 Knipe Land had retained. 
16. On April 2, 2008, Knipe Land, through its attorney, demanded payment of 
$202,500.00 from Defendants and also demanded $17,500.00 from Robertsons relating to 
the Harmon transaction that was cancelled. This was the first time anyone on behalf of 
Knipe Land had requested any portion of the monies paid by Harmons despite the fact 
that the Harmon transaction had been terminated on August 16,2006 and $15,000.00 in 
earnest money had been returned to the Harmons. 
17. On April 16,2008, Knipe Land filed suit for one-half of the earnest 
monies paid by Harmons and MidAmerican based on the 2005 and 2007 Employment 
Contracts claiming the earnest monies paid by Harmons and MidAmerican were 
forfeited. 
18. Knipe Land is attempting to claim $225,000.00 of the earnest monies paid 
by MidAmerican despite the fact that had MidAmerican completed its purchase of 
Defendants' real property, Knipe Land would only have received a commission of 
$150,000.00. Mark Norem, real estate broker for MidAmerican, would have received a 
commission of$150,000.00 as well as Mark Norem and Knipe Land had agreed to split 
the 5% commission had the sale been completed. 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF -
PageS /5'38 
19. Knipe Land intentionally did not tell Defendants that it was claiming one-
half of the earnest monies paid by MidAmerican until Defendants signed an "extension" 
to the listing agreement on February 19,2009. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
1. 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT BREACH THE 2005 AND 2007 EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS AS NO EARNEST MONIES WERE FORFEITED 
Knipe Land claims that it is entitled to one-half ofthe earnest monies paid by both 
Harmons and MidAmerican because those earnest monies were forfeited. Defendants 
claim that the earnest monies were not forfeited as neither Harmons or MidAmerican 
breached their respective purchase agreements, therefore, no forfeiture occurred. 
A. Knipe Land has the burden of proof. 
In O'Conner v. Harger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3d 846 (2008), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held: 
The burden of proof for showing the existence of a contract and breach 
is on the plaintiff. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 
747,9 P.3d 1204, 1213 (2000). Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the 
defendant has the burden of pleading and proving any affirmative defenses 
to enforcement of that contract. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho at 747,9 
P.3d at 1213. 
145 Idaho at 910. In this action, in order to prove Robertsons and Robertson Kennels 
breached the Employment Contracts, Knipe Land must prove that both Harmons and 
MidAmerican forfeited the earnest monies they paid to Robertsons and/or Robertson 
Kennels. 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
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B. Knipe Land must prove that both Harmons and MidAmerican breached the 
respective purchase agreements they entered into to prove earnest monies were 
forfeited. 
On June 17,2005, the Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge for the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Kootenai, granted a Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and ordered the recovery of an earnest money 
deposit in the case of Sauls v. Luchi, CV 2004 1616 (Dist. Ct. First Judicial Dist. Idaho 
June 17,2005) ruling: 
The primary purpose of earnest money is to ensure that the seller will 
recover damages if the buyer defaults. Id (quoting John Q. Reilly. The 
Language of Real Estate 131, (4th ed. 2004). 
* * * 
Parties cannot recover an earnest money deposit if they breach and 
there is a valid liquidated damages clause. Graves, 75 Idaho at 456. 
Damages or forfeiture clauses have to bear, "a reasonable relation to actual 
damages," in order to be valid. Id However, if the forfeiture or damages 
stipulated by the contract are arbitrary and unreasonable in light of the 
anticipated damages, they are invalid as a penalty. Id In the present case, 
the buyer did not breach the contract, so even ifthe forfeiture clause is 
valid regarding the earnest money deposit, it is not applicable. (Emphasis 
added). 
(Sauls v. Luchi, CV 2004 1616 (Dist. Ct. First Judicial Dist. Idaho June 17,2005) 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, pp. 2 - 4, See Appendix 1). There can be no forfeiture of earnest money 
unless the buyer (e.g. Harmons and/or MidAmerican) first breach the purchase and sale 
agreement. As such, Knipe Land must prove that Harmons and MidAmerican committed 
a breach of contract for there to be any forfeited earnest money. 
In People v. Blair, 215 Il1.2d 427,831 N.E.2d 604 (2005), the Supreme Court of 
Illinois held: 
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Forfeiture is defined as: "the loss of a right privilege, or property 
because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty." Black's Law 
Dictionary 677 (8th ed. 2004); see also Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 891 (1993) (Forfeit means "something which is lost or the right 
to which is alienated by a crime, offense, neglect of duty, or breach of 
contract"). (Emphasis added). 
831 N.E.2d at 615. In Louisiana Workers Compensation Corporation v. Grayson, 746 
So.2d 121 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, held: 
"Forfeiture", on the other hand, is standardly defined as a surrender of 
something as punishment for a crime, offense, error, or breach of contract. 
Webster, supra. 
* * * 
Reinforcing this distinction is the legal definition of "forfeiture" as: "a 
divestiture of specific property without compensation; it imposes a loss by 
the taking away of some pre-existing valid right without compensation." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990). Black's also defines 
"forfeiture" as a "deprivation or destruction of a right," and the "[1]oss of 
some right or property as a penalty for some illegal act" as well as a 
"[l]oss of property or money because of a breach of a legal obligation." 
Hence, the word "forfeiture" has a strong legal significance and connotes a 
destruction of a right and a "taking away" of property in connection with 
an illegal act ... 
746 So.2d at 123 - 124. In Armstrong v. Keene, 861 N.E.2d 1198 (Indiana App. 2007), 
the Indiana Court of Appeals held: 
Forfeiture is defined as "[t]he divestiture of property without 
compensation" and "[t]he loss of a right, privilege, or property because of 
a crime, breach of obligation or neglect of duty." Black's Law Dictionary 
677 (8th ed. 2004). 
861 N.E.2d at 1201, footnote 3. In In the Matter of: Geraldine H. Soileau, 488 F.3d 302 
(5th Cir. 2007), the United States Court of Appeals held: 
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a forfeiture is: (1) "[t]he divestiture 
of property without compensation," (2) "[t]he loss of a right, privilege, or 
property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty," (3) 
"[s]omething (esp. money or property) lost or confiscated by this process; 
a penalty", (4) "A destruction or deprivation of some estate or right 
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because of the failure to perform some obligation or condition contained 
in the contract." The American Heritage Dictionary defines a forfeiture as 
"the act of surrendering something as a forfeit" then defines forfeit as 
"something surrendered as punishment for a crime, offense, error, or 
breach of contract. (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis added). 
488 F.3d at 310. In Dorroh v. Williams, 168 N.C.App. 239, 607 S.E.2d 54 (2005), the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals held: 
607 S.E.2d at 
Also, defendant does not show what exactly was forfeited. Forfeiture, 
as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, is the "divestiture of property 
without compensation" or "[t]he loss of a right, privilege, or property 
because of a crime, breach of 0 bligation, or neglect of duty." Black's Law 
Dictionary 677 (8 th ed. 2004). 
It should also be noted that a person cannot forfeit something they do not own or 
possess. In United States v. Croce, 334 F.Supp.2d 781 (E.D. Penn. 2004), the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held: 
Legal dictionaries also recognize that ownership must precede forfeiture. 
For example, Black's definesfor/eiture as "[t]he loss ofa right, privilege, 
or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty," 
and further explains that "[t]itle is simultaneously transferred to another, 
such as the government." Black's Law Dictionary 771 (7th ed. 1999). 
Forfeiture could not "simultaneously" transfer title at the time it is ordered 
unless title was vested, at that time, in the one subject to forfeiture. In 
other words, this legal dictionary supports our intuition that a court cannot 
order someone to forfeit what he does not own. Indeed, the history of 
forfeiture confirms that understanding. (Emphasis added). 
334 F.Supp.2d at 785. In Baldwin v. Cook, 232 Ky. 365,23 S.W.2d 601 (1930), the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals held: 
The Court of Appeals of St. Louis, Mo., in Casey v. St. Louis Transit Co., 
116 Mo. App. 236, 91 S.W. 419, 423, said this: "The word 'forfeit' has a 
well established meaning in the law. 'To forfeit' is 'to divest or to suffer 
divestiture of property without compensation in consequence of a default 
or offense. '" 
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The Supreme Court of California, in Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co., 
156 Cal. 657, 105 P. 971, 973, says: "The term 'forfeit' in law means 'to 
lose and surrender to an individual or the state (something that belongs to 
one) for misconduct, or breach of duty-lose title to as a penalty. '" 
We have found no instance in which this court has defined the verb 
"forfeit," but we had found an opinion in which we defined the noun 
"forfeiture," and that definition is in harmony with the definitions given 
above. We refer to the case of Hogg and Pluto Coal Co. v. Forsythe, 198 
Ky. 462, 248 S.W. 1008, 1011, where we said: "A forfeiture from its 
nature implies the taking away from one of some pre-existing right." All 
of these citations show that, in order to forfeit anything, we must first have 
it; we must have some sort of title. 
23 S.W.2d at 604. 
Clearly, both Harmons and MidAmerican would have to have breached the 
purchase and sale agreements they entered into before a forfeiture could occur. As such, 
Knipe Land must prove Harmons and/or MidAmerican breached the purchase and sale 
agreements they entered into before the forfeited earnest money clause in the 
Employment Contracts has any relevance. 
C. If Knipe Land proves that Harmons and/or MidAmerican breached the purchase 
and sale agreements they entered into, then Knipe Land must prove the 
commission it was entitled to receive had each respective transaction closed. 
Both the 2005 and 2007 Employment Contracts provide: 
Should a deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, 
one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the Broker, as the balance 
shall be paid to me. The Broker's share of any forfeited deposit or 
amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the 
commISSIOn. 
The Employment Contracts do not define what is meant by "the commission." Under 
Idaho law, a real estate broker is not entitled to any commission unless the transaction 
closes. In Margaret H. Wayne v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,846 P.2d 904 (1993), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
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A growing number of courts have, however, added a requirement that 
there must be a closing of title for the broker to receive a commission, 
adopting the rationale of Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 
236 A.2d 843 (1967): 
When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a purchaser for 
it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he produces a purchaser 
ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the 
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so, and (c) 
the purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in accordance 
with the provisions of the contract. 
236 A.2d at 855. this position was addressed by our Court of Appeals in 
Strout Realty, Inc. v. Milhous, 107 Idaho 330, 689 P.2d 222 (CLApp. 
1984), where a seller under an installment land contract claimed that he 
was not liable for the commission because the buyer defaulted before he 
had fully performed and was therefore not "ready, willing, and able." In 
analyzing the point in time when the ability of the buyer is to be 
determined, the Court of Appeals employed the Ellsworth Dobbs rule in 
finding that the commission had been earned at the time the transaction 
was closed. We also adopt the three-part test set out in Ellsworth Dobbs 
as the general rule to determine when a real estate broker earns his 
commission. Because the transaction between Lipsky and Wayne was 
never closed, Reynolds did not earn his commission. 
123 Idaho at 260. Because neither the Harmon transaction or the MidAmerican 
transaction closed, no commission was earned by Knipe Land and therefore, Knipe Land 
is not entitled to any earnest monies that were allegedly forfeited. 
It should also be noted that even if Idaho law is ignored and the Employment 
Contracts are interpreted solely on the language contained within them, "the commission" 
could be interpreted as zero because no sale was ever consummated. It also could be 
interpreted as 5% of any alleged forfeited earnest money. Another ambiguity is whether 
"the commission" talces into account any commission that Knipe Land was sharing with 
Mark Norem. Clearly, in this action, Knipe Land is taking the position that "the 
commission" means 5% of $6,000,000.00 or $300,000.00 and therefore, Knipe Land is 
entitled to one-half of any earnest monies allegedly forfeited, or $225,000.00. However, 
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in this scenario, Mark Norem, broker for MidAmerican, was to receive one-half of any 
commission paid at closing. Therefore, Knipe Land's position is that it would receive 
more money if MidAmerican breached the purchase contract than if the transaction had 
closed. Such a result would be unconscionable. Since Knipe Land provided the 
ambiguous language, the language contained in the Employment Contracts must be 
construed against Knipe Land. 
II. 
THE 2005 AND 2007 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ARE UNENFORCEABLE 
BECAUSE THEY VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY 
In the Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment filed February 12,2009, 
the Court found that the Employment Contracts between Knipe Land and Defendants 
were valid and suffered no legal deficiency. (Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p.2). This ruling was based upon Defendants' argument that the Employment Contracts 
did not contain enforceable legal descriptions and did not comply with Idaho Real Estate 
License Law, Idaho Code § 54-2001 et seq. Since February 12,2009, Defendants have 
raised the Ellsworth Dobbs Rule that both the 2005 and 2007 Employment Contracts 
violate public policy and therefore, are unenforceable. The Court has yet to rule on this 
Issue. 
Both Employment Contracts provide: 
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall 
find a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price and 
terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, or that during your 
employment you place me into contact with a buyer to or through whom at 
any time within 180 days after termination of said employment, I may sell 
or convey said property, I hereby agree to pay you in cash for your 
services a commission equal in amount to 5 percent of said selling price. 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
Page 12 15"'45 
This provision clearly violates public policy and renders the Employment Contracts 
unenforceable as it provides that Knipe Land would receive a commission even if the 
transaction did not close. Virtually identical language was declared to violate public 
policy and was therefore unenforceable in Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 
253,846 P.2d 904 (1993) when the Idaho Supreme Court held as follows: 
Idaho has, in the past, adopted the traditional rule that a broker earns 
his commission when he procures a buyer who is ready, willing and able 
to purchase on terms acceptable to the seller. Rogers v. Hendrix, 92 Idaho 
141,438 P.2d 653 (1968). A growing number of courts have, however, 
added a requirement that there must be a closing of title for the broker to 
receive a commission, adopting the rationale of Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 50 N.J. 528,236 A.2d 843 (1967): 
When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a purchaser for 
it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he produces a purchaser 
ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the 
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so, and (c) 
the purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in accordance 
with the provisions of the contract. 
* * * 
We also adopt the three-part test set out in Ellsworth Dobbs as the 
general rule to determine when a real estate broker earns his commission. 
Because the transaction between Lipsky and Wayne was never closed, 
Reynolds did not earn his commission. 
123 Idaho at 259 - 260. In Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528,236 A.2d 843 
(1967), the New Jersey Supreme Court held: 
Further we hold that even if both broker and seller, on execution of the 
contract of sale, in good faith believe the buyer to be financially able to 
perform, and it turns out otherwise at the crucial time, the seller cannot be 
held for commission. What must be regarded as the fundamental 
intendment of the parties, owner and broker, i.e., that the owner will sell 
and the buyer will pay, and the broker will thus earn his commission out 
of the proceeds, cannot be ignored in this connection. This uncomplicated 
reality should not be complicated by controversies over who knew what 
with respect to the buyer's financial capacity to close the title. The risk of 
such inability at that crucial time must be treated as a normal incident of 
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the brokerage business. In our view, these statements represent reasonable 
and just rules for determining the problems thus far discussed. Any cases 
in our reports inconsistent therewith, particularly those which hold that 
once an owner-seller makes a contract to sell his property to the broker's 
customer, the customer's financial ability to perform is no longer open to 
question, are overruled, and can no longer be considered the law of this 
State. 
* * * 
The rules which we have set down above to govern dealings, rights, 
and duties between brokers and owners are necessary for the protection of 
property owners, and constitute the public policy of our State. Whenever 
there is substantial inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage 
between the broker and the other party involved, any form of agreement 
designed to create liability on the part of the owner for commission upon 
the signing of a contract to sell to a prospective buyer, brought forward by 
the broker, even though consummation of the sale is frustrated by the 
inability or the unwillingness 0 the buyer to pay the purchase money and 
close the title, we regard as so contrary to the common understanding of 
men, and also so contrary to common fairness, as to require a court to 
condemn it as unconscionable. See Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 48 N.J. 
483,487,226 A.2d 602 (1967). 
In view of our holding here that a broker is not entitled to commission 
from the seller if title does not pass because ofthe inability or fault ofthe 
customer, and the further rule to be expounded hereafter respecting the 
liability of the buyer to the broker where the buyer is the defaulting party, 
in our judgment public policy requires the courts to read into every 
brokerage agreement or contract of sale a requirement that barring default 
by the seller, commissions shall not be deemed earned against him unless 
the contract of sale is performed. By the same token, whenever the 
substantial inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage to which 
we have adverted appears, a provision to the contrary in an agreement 
prepared or presented or negotiated or procured by the broker shall be 
deemed inconsistent with public policy and unenforceable. Compare 
McKelvy v. Milford, supra, 37 So.2d at p. 373. (Emphasis added). 
236 A.2d at 855 - 858. Based on the "Ellsworth Dobbs Rule," the forfeiture provisions 
in the Employment Contracts violate public policy as well. Therefore, the Employment 
Contracts entered into between Knipe Land and Defendants are unenforceable. 
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III. 
KNIPE LAND WAIVED ANY CLAIM IT HAD TO THE ALLEGED FORFEITED 
EARNEST MONIES BY ITS ACTIONS AND CONDUCT 
In Record Steel & Construction, Inc. v. Martel Construction, Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 
923 P.2d 995 (App. 1996), the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
A waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right 
or advantage. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 
812,853 P.2d 553,557 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 917,114 S.Ct. 309, 
126 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993); Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 
253,256, 846 P.2d 904,907 (1993). Waiver will not be inferred; the 
intent to waive must clearly appear. Id.; Riverside Development Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 520, 650 P.2d 657,662 (1982). The party 
asserting waiver must show that he acted reasonably in reliance upon it 
and that he has altered his position to his detriment. Margaret H Wayne 
Trust, 123 Idaho at 256,846 P.2d at 907. 
129 Idaho at 292. In Abrams v. Porter, 128 Idaho 869, 920 P.2d 386 (1996), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
"In order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear, 
although it may be established by conduct." Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-
Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
128 Idaho at 873. In this action, Knipe Land clearly waived any alleged right it had to a 
portion of the earnest monies. Knipe Land's conduct clearly establishes a waiver. 
A. Knipe Land waived any claim it may have had to earnest monies from the 
Harmon transaction. 
In the case ofthe Harmon transaction, Knipe Land waived any claim it may have 
had to the $35,000.00 in earnest monies by remitting to Robertsons a check in the amount 
of$25,000.00 on February 24, 2006 and a check in the amount of$10,000.00 on May 17, 
2006 from the Knipe Land Trust Account. By remitting the check to Robertsons, Knipe 
Land admitted there was no dispute as to Robertsons' entitlement to the earnest monies 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-2047(2). Further, by remitting the earnest monies to 
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Robertsons, Robertsons altered their position. First, Robertsons agreed to extend 
Harmons' time to close on the purchase of their real property based upon payment of the 
$35,000.00 to them. Second, Robertsons, on behalf of Robertson Kennels, entered into 
the 2007 Employment contract with Knipe Land and ultimately the Agreement to Sell 
and Purchase with MidArnerican based upon his understanding that Robertsons and/or 
Robertson Kennels were entitled to 100% of all non-refundable earnest monies based 
upon Knipe Land's previous course of conduct in their business dealings. It is also 
significant that Knipe Land did not request any portion of the Harmon earnest monies 
until after Robertsons requested the $22,500.00 Knipe Land withheld in the 
MidAmerican transaction and Knipe Land's attorneys became involved. In fact, Knipe 
Land made no request for a portion of the Harmon earnest monies until April 2, 2008, 
which was almost two (2) full years after Robertsons received the earnest monies from 
Harmons. 
B. Knipe Land waived any claim it may have had to the earnest monies from the 
MidAmerican transaction by the following conduct. 
1. Failing to advise Robertsons they were entitled to a portion of the earnest 
monies relating to the Harmon transaction thereby creating a course of conduct in Knipe 
Land's business dealing upon which Robertsons and Robertson Kennels relied upon in 
making decisions when entering in Agreements to Sell and Purchase with MidAmerican. 
2. Failing to provide in the Agreements to Sell and Purchase between 
MidAmerican and Defendants that Knipe Land would receive a portion of the earnest 
monies in the event of a "forfeiture." By not following the statutory requirements 
contained in Idaho Code § 54-2051(4), Knipe Land told all parties it would not be 
receiving any portion of the earnest monies. Further, Robertsons and Robertson Kennels 
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relied on the fact that they would be receiving 100% of the earnest monies paid by 
MidAmerican when they entered into the Agreements to Sell and Purchase, as they would 
not have done so had it been set forth that Knipe Land would have received a portion of 
the earnest monies. 
3. Advising Robertsons the earnest monies were non-forfeited and 
specifically instructing First American Title Company to remit to Robertsons and 
Robertson Kennels earnest monies totaling $427,500.00 on September 26,2007, October 
23,2007 and December 18,2007, respectively. By doing so, Knipe Land admitted there 
was no dispute as to Robertsons and Robertson Kennels' entitlement to the earnest 
monies pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-2047(2). Further, by instructing the title company to 
remit earnest monies in the amount of $427,500.00 and Robertsons and Robertson 
Kennels accepting the earnest monies, a taxable event occurred. As a result, Robertsons 
and Robertson Kennels were required to pay income tax on the $427,000.00 for tax year 
2007 as the $427,500.00 became income to Robertsons and Robertson Kennels upon 
receipt. Clearly, by receiving the $427,500.00, Robertsons and Robertson Kennels 
changed the position of their detriment. Further, the balance of the monies after taxes 
was used by Robertsons and Robertson Kennels to payoff all debts they owed against the 
real property that was the subject of the MidAmerican Agreements to Sell and Purchase. 
Finally, Robertsons' social security benefits were reduced as a result of receipt of the 
earnest monies. 
IV. 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT, JOHN KNIPE, AND KNIPE LAND 
TORTIOUSL Y CONVERTED $22,500.00 TO THEIR OWN USE 




In Gissel v. State, 111 Idaho 725, 727 P.2d 1153 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court 
Conversion is "any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over 
another's personal property in denial or inconsistent with his rights 
therein, such as a tortious taking of another's chattel, or any wrongful 
exercise ... over another's goods, depriving him of the possession, 
permanently or for an indefinite time." Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 
118 P.2d 729 (1941). Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or 
control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the rights of 
another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other 
the full value of the chattel. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 222A, 
(1965). The state's refusal to account for the money received unlawfully 
interfered with the Gissels' possessory rights. 
111 Idaho at 727. In this action, the $22,500.00 that was paid to Knipe Land by the title 
company was in anticipation of a commission that Knipe Land would earn upon closing 
of Mid American's purchase. The closing did not occur so Knipe Land did not earn a 
commission and had no right to the funds. Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 
Idaho 253,846 P.2d 904 (1993). As such, the $22,500.00 is Defendants' property to 
which they are entitled. Instead of remitting the funds to Defendants when requested, 
Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, and Knipe Land spent the funds for their own 
purposes. 
V. 
KNIPE LAND VIOLATED THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
IN ITS DEALINGS WITH DEFENDANTS 
In Fern v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 133 P.3d 1240 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
The purpose of the ICPA is "to protect both consumers and businesses 
against unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive practices 
in the conduct of trade or commerce, and to provide efficient and 
economical procedures to secure such protection. I. C. § 48-601; White, 
140 Idaho at 890,104 P.3d at 364. The ICPA should be construed 
liberally. In re W. Acceptance Corp., 117 Idaho 399, 401, 788 P.2d 214, 
216 (1990). Idaho Code § 48-603 contains a knowledge element and an 
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enumeration of unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct oftrade 
which our legislature has declared unlawful. The real property at issue is 
clearly within the definition of "goods." See I.C. § 48-602(6); see also 
White, 140 Idaho at 890, 104 P.3d at 364. 
142 Idaho at 779 - 780. Idaho Code § 48-603 provides in part: 
48-603. Unfair methods and practices. - The following unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared to be unlawful, 
where a person knows, or in the exercise of due care should know, that he 
has in the past, or is: 
* * * 
(12) Obtaining the signature of the buyer to a contract when it contains 
blank spaces to be filled in after it has been signed; 
(13) Failing to deliver to the consumer at the time ofthe consumer's 
signature a legible copy of the contract or of any other document which 
the seller or lender has required or requested the buyer to sign, and which 
he has signed, during or after the contract negotiation; 
* * * 
(17) Engaging in any act or practice which is otherwise misleading, 
false, or deceptive to the consumer; 
(18) Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice in the 
conduct of trade or commerce, as provided in section 48-603C, Idaho 
Code, provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall not 
apply to a regulated lender as that term is defined in subsection (37) of 
section 28-41-301, Idaho Code; 
The failure of Knipe Land to put an enforceable legal description into the 2005 and 2007 
Employment Contracts constitutes having Robertsons and Robertson Kennels signing a 
contract with a blank: space to be filled in after obtaining their signature. Failing to 
provide Robertsons and Robertson Kennels a copy of the contract they signed at the time 
they signed it also constitutes a violation under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The 
failure to provide Robertsons and Robertson Kennels a complete copy of the complete 
"renewal agreements" is also a violation. Failing to request a portion of the Harmon 
DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
Page 19 
earnest monies until after obtaining the 2007 Employment Contract constitutes a 
deceptive practice. Failing to put into the Agreements to Sell and Purchase that Knipe 
Land would claim a portion of any earnest monies from MidAmerican is also a deceptive 
practice. 
Finally, Knipe Land's activities in obtaining an "extension" to their listing 
agreement with Defendants in February, 2008 knowing full well Defendants would not 
sign an extension if Defendants were aware that Knipe Land was going to make a claim 
to one-half of the MidAmerican earnest monies is unconscionable. 
Based upon Idaho Code § 48-603C, it is for the Court, not the jury, that 
determines whether there has been a violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Further, the Court may award actual and punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 48-
608. 
CONCLUSION 
Harmons did not breach the Purchase and Sale Agreement they entered into with 
Robertsons. Therefore, Harmons did not forfeit the $35,000.00 they paid to Robertsons 
in consideration of Robertsons extending the time for them to close. 
MidAmerican did not breach the Agreement to Sell and Purchase it entered into 
with Defendants. Therefore, MidAmerican did not forfeit the $450,000.00 in earnest 
monies it paid, of which $22,500.00 was wrongfully kept by Knipe Land. 
The Employment Contracts Knipe Land used to obtain Defendants' listing of their 
real property violate public policy and are void. Further, Knipe Land waived any alleged 
right it had to the earnest monies by its conduct and actions. 
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Finally, Knipe Land's dealings with Defendants were unconscionable. 
DATED this II. "itay of June, 2009. uJ ( fo. 
Derek A. Pica 
Attorney for Defendants 
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DEFENDANTS' / COUNTERCLAIMANTS' / THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRIEF-
Page 21 15 StI 
APPENDIX 1 
1555 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of KOOTENAI )" 
FILED _______ _ 
AT O'Clock M 
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 

















Case No. CV 20041616 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOT 
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
This is a case for damages related to a breach of contract in which defendant Luchi agreed to 
sell, and plaintiffs Sauls agreed to buy a house in Kootenai County. The Sauls claimed Luchi 
anticipatorily breached the contract by entering into another contract to sell the same property to 
another party. 
The jury in this case returned a verdict for the seller Luchi. Sauls, the prospective buyers, 
moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to recover the $3,000.00 earnest money deposit 
they paid to Luchi. The parties submitted minimal briefmg on the issue, and oral argument was held 
on June 1,2005. 
II. ANALYSIS. 
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Sauls argue that under either the Sauls' or Luchi' s view of the evidence, the Sauls' earnest 
money deposit should have been returned. The only legal argument offered by Sauls is that the 
court should grant a motion for IN.O.V. when the jury's verdict is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Motion for Judgment N.O.V., p. 1., citing Brand SCarp. v. King, 102 Idaho 
731,732,639 P.2d 429, 430 (1981). 
Luchi argues Sauls' complaint never demanded a return of the deposit or "earnest money" 
and did not seek restitution. Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment N.O.Y., p. 1. Luchi notes 
the jury answered question number three on the verdict fonn which asked what were plaintiff 
(Sauls') damages as a result of defendant's (Luchi's) breach of contract or fraud, with "$0". Id. at p. 
2. 
In ruling on a motion for judgment n.o.v., the trial court must view the facts as ifthe 
moving party has admitted the truth of all the non-moving parties evidence. 
I.R.C.P. 50(b); Mann v. Sa/eway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194 
(1974); Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). If, after 
reviewing the evidence in this manner, the court fmds that the evidence is of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached the 
same conclusion as did the jury, then the jury's verdict will be upheld. Quick v. 
Crane; Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 749 P.2d 1012 (Ct.App.1988) review 
denied, 116 Idaho 467, 776 P.2d 829 (1988). Furthennore, the detennination of 
whether the evidence before the Court considering the judgment n.o.v. is sufficient 
to create an issue of fact is purely a question of law. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 
759,727 P.2dat 1187 (1986). 
Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478, 797 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1990). 
Earnest money is, "[a] deposit paid by a prospective buyer to show a good-faith intention to 
complete the transaction." Black's Law Dictionary, (8th ed. 2004). The primary purpose of earnest 
money is to ensure that the seller will recover darnages if the buyer defaults. Id. (quoting John Q. 
Reilly. The Language a/Real Estate 131, (4th ed. 2004). 
Earnest money agreements are typically divided into two categories: "[t]hose which 
contemplate a sale pursuant to a future land sale contract between the buyer and the seller 
and ... those which contemplate closing at sale for cash." White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 4, 644 P.2d 
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323 (1982). Under the fIrst category, an earnest money agreement, "will not be specifIcally 
enforced if its terms are too indefInite, uncertain or incomplete to ascertain." Id. (quoting Ford v. 
Lord, 99 Idaho 580, 586 P.2d 270, 273 (1978». However, when the earnest money agreement is 
meant as a cash sale, it is less likely that the court will impose terms which were not actually agreed 
on by the parties. !d. at 5. Furthermore, "the need for specifIcity in written subsidiary terms" is 
reduced in an earnest money agreement for cash sale. Id. 
In this case, the earnest money agreement, "contemplate[ d] closing at sale for cash." 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; Complaint Exhibit A. Consequently, the earnest money agreement is deemed 
complete as long as the parties have included all the essential terms of the contract. Wolcott v. 
Booth, 101 Idaho 89, 91, 609 P.2d 156 (1980). Most earnest money agreements include a 
description of the land, amount of initial deposit, terms and price of future installments, etc. If the 
earnest money agreement contains the necessary terms, then it can be specifIcally enforced. Id. 
Conversely, an earnest money agreement is not complete if it, "contemplates that the parties 
will enter into a land sale contract which would provide the rest of the details of the transaction." Id. 
at 90 (citing Luke v. Conrad, 96 Idaho 221, 526 P.2d 181 (1974». Incomplete earnest money 
agreements cannot be specifIcally enforced. Id. 
A buyer is entitled to a recover an earnest money deposit when the seller breaches, and the 
buyer elects to rescind the contract. McMahon v. Cooper, 70 Idaho 139, 147, 212 P.2d 657. In 
order for the buyer to be able to rescind the contract, the seller's breach must be substantial and, "of 
such character as to indicate an intention on the part of the [seller] to abandon the contract." Id. at 
141 
Furthermore, a buyer may recover an earnest money deposit under a special lien if the seller 
fails to provide consideration. Idaho Code § 45-804 reads: 
One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an agreement 
of the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of possession, 
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for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a 
failure to consideration. 
ill Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954), a buyer was able to recover a down 
payment, including an earnest money deposit, after the buyer breached the sales contract. ill 
Graves, the buyer breached the contract and retained possession of the property as a security for the 
return of her down payment. The court held that the buyer did not have to have possession of the 
land to secure the return of her down payment because Idaho Code § 45-804 guaranteed the return 
of it regardless of possession. Id, at 460. 
ill the present case, the jury found that the seller did not breach the contract nor did the seller 
commit fraud. Thus, the buyer cannot recover his earnest money deposit on the theory of rescission. 
However, the buyer can recover the earnest money deposit under Idaho Code § 45-804, because the 
seller failed to provide consideration by failing to deliver the property that was the subject of the 
agreement. 
Parties cannot recover an earnest money deposit if they breach and there is a valid liquidated 
damages clause. Graves, 75 Idaho at 456. Damages or forfeiture clauses have to bear, "a reasonable 
relation to actual damages," in order to be valid. Id. However, if the forfeiture or damages stipulated 
by the contract are arbitrary and unreasonable in light of the anticipated damages, they are invalid as 
a penalty. Id. ill the present case, the buyer did not breach the contract, so even if the forfeiture 
clause is valid regarding the earnest money deposit, it is not applicable. 
Sauls are entitled to recover the earnest money deposit under Idaho Code § 45-804 because 
Luchi failed to provide consideration by failing to deliver the property that was the subject of the 
agreement. Luchi cannot be allowed to sell the property twice, keeping the fIrst earnest money 
deposit. Luchi knows that, as he tried to return the earnest money to the Sauls, but they ripped up 
the check. That sequence of events does nothing to change the legal consequence of Idaho Code § 
45-804. 
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m. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiffs' "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the 
Verdict" is GRANTED, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Luchi in the amount of 
$3,000.00. Plaintiffs' counsel is to prepare an Judgment consistent with this Order. 
Entered this _____ day of June 2005. 
John T. Mitchell, District Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that on the _____ day of June, 2005, a true copy of the foregoing was mailed postage 
prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following: 
Lawyer Lawyer Fax # 
Charles R. Dean 664-9844 John P. Whelan 664-2240 
Secretary 
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Come now Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant, by and through their undersigned counsel 
of record, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b), 26(e). and 33, and respectfully move 
the Court for its Order limiting testimony by Defendants at the trial of this matter in the 
following particulars: 
1) To exclude testimony by Cindy Crane. Although Defendants identified Ms. 
Crane as a potential witness, they refused to disclose the extent of her relevant knowledge. 
Further, none of the discovery engaged in by the parties prior to the disclosure of their respective 
trial witnesses indicated that Ms. Crane would have any relevant testimony. Secondly, on 
infonnation and belief, Ms. Crane's testimony will consist exclusively of inadmissible parole 
evidence seeking to modify, supplement. or otherwise explain the operation of those Sell and 
Purchase Agreements entered into by her employer and Defendants for the purchase of 
Defendants' land in late 2007. 
2) To exclude evidence and testimony offered by Defendants claiming or 
asserting that any potential interest by a third-party "cooperating broker'~ in any commission that 
would have eventuated from the sale of Defendants' real property to a third party would 
foreclose, restrict, or otherwise diminish Plaintiff's entitlement to receive one-half of all deposits 
and monies paid and later forfeited by potential third-party purchasers. Such arguments and the 
apparent intention to offer testimony supporting them have only been revealed in Defendants' 
trial brief which was received on June 16,2009 by Plaintiff, despite Defendants having been 
asked to disclose the full scope of their claims and defenses against Plaintiff's recovery in 
Interrogatories answered by them in July 2008. These Answers to Interrogatories have not been 
supplemented and nothing revealed in the course of discovery has clearly indicated that 
Defendants intend to pursue such arguments. 
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This Motion is based on the matters on file herein, the Affidavit of Mark S. Geston in 
support hereof, and on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith. Plaintiff 
further submits Defendants' Answers to the relevant Interrogatories which are Interrogatories 1, 
10 and 11, as exhibits to the Affidavit of Mark S. Geston filed herewith. 
DATED: June t!;2009. 
STOEL RlVES LLP 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Attorney at Law 
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Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MARK S. GESTON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney with the law fillll ofStoel Rives LLP, counsel of record for 
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants, and as such have personal knowledge of the matters set forth 
herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a full, true, and correct reproduction of pages 1, 2: 
7,8,9, and 12 of DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS, which pages fully reflect Interrogatory No.1, 
Interrogatory No. 10, and Interrogatory No. 11 propounded by Plaintiff to Defendants, together 
with Defendants' full Answer to each, and the signature and acknowledgment page of said 
document. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
~LL8..~ 
Mark S. Geston 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / J,!A day of June, 2009. 
N~ 
My Commission Expires /,;2"3/· 2"/3 
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Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS 
COMBS NOW. Defendants. Richard A. Robertson and Johnnie L. Robertson. 
husband and wife; and Robertson Kennels, Inc., an Idaho Corporation and Answers 
Plaintiff's First Set ofInterrogatones to Defendants as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please state the name; address, and telephone 
nwnber of each and every person known to you or your attorneys who has any 
lmowledge ott or who purports to have any knowledge of any of the facts of this case, 
and please fUrther describe in as much factual detail as you are able the evjdence or 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS 1'0 l'l...AlNrIFF·S PIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS - Paee 1 
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· infonnation whioh each such person or party is believed by you to possess. By this 
Interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks names, addresses and telephone numbers of all individuals 
who have knowledge or who purport to have mowledge of the facts of this case which 
pertain to issues of damages as well as liability as well as the substance of such 
knowledge as each of them may possess insofar as you are aware. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.1: 
Richard A. Robertson 







Cindy Crane - Pacific Corp. 
Bill Febrmans - President Mid-American 
Em.ployees of First American Title Company of Idaho, 7311 Poto:rnac Drive, 
Boise, Idaho 83704; (208) 375-0700 
Plaintiff is fully aw~ of the address and telephone numbers of the above 
persons. Plaintiff is also fully aware of the knowledge each person has with regard to tbis 
litigation. 
Defendant's response to this Interrogatory will be supplemented as additional 
witnesses are identified. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please identify each and every person you expect 
to call as an eXpert witness at the trial of this matter, and for eaoh person state: 
(a) . The qualifications upon which you intend to rely to establish the person as 
an expert witnessi 
(b) A complete statement of all opuuons to be expressed, and the basis and 
reasons therefore; 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OJ'INTERROGATORIES TO 
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Exhibit '~" as neither contract contained a legal description of any real property that was 
to be the subject of the respective contracts. Since no legal descriptions were contained 
in the respective Employment Contracts, all real property owned by each respective 
Defendant in the oounties of Payette and Washington was not the subject of the 
Employment Contracts. The legal descriptions for all real property owned by each 
Defend811t in the counties of Payette and Washington are contained in the respective valid 
Sale and Purchase Agreements entered into with Mid-America. which Plaintiff has 
personal records of and' is aoutely aware. 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please describe in as much factual detail as you 
ate able, each and every act. statement, communication, or other circumstance which you 
contend indicted or otherwise lead you to believe that Plaintiff had no intCJ.'est in or claim 
to any of the monies deposited or paid at any time after January 1,2007. by potential 
purchasers ot'real property owned by Defendants in Payette County, andlor Washington 
County, Idaho or that PJaintiffhad renounced. released, or otherwise waived any such 
right or claim as it may have bad thereto. Your response to this Interrogatory should 
further describe any docwnents which embody, refer to, or reflect such admission or 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.9: oBmcr as being overbroad and 
vague as to th~ information Plaintiff is seeking. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please describe all c~umstances, acts or 
omissions of Plaintiff which you contend prevent or deprive Plaintiff of any interest in or 
right to recover tDOmes paid by Potential purchasers oftha real property that is the 
subjcot Of the 2005 Employment Contract and the 2007 Ero.pl~yment Contract, or either 
DERNDANTS' ANSWERS TO PLAlNTlFF·S FIRST SET or INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS - Page 7 
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of them, or which otbCJ;Wise reduces or diminishes Plaintiff's entitlement thereto, 
including without limitation, any acts or omissions which you contend constituted a 
breach by Plaintiff of the 200S Employment Contract a.nd the 2007 Employment 
Contract, or either of them. Your response hereto should inolude but should not be 
limited to the identification of every statutory, regulatory, or factual defect or 
insufficiency in the fol'IIl, contenft execution or performance of the 200S Employment 
Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, that would prevent or 
restrict the enforcement of either such contract in a court ofJaw. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: OBJECT as being overbroad and 
vague as to the infoxmation Plaintiff is seeking. Defendants further object as the 
Interrogatory seeks the work product of Defendants' anomey. Without waiving this 
objec~on, see Defendants' Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party qairn. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: To the extent you have not already done so, 
please identify and describe with particularity each and every factual, statutory Or 
regulatory insufficiency in the fo~ content, execution or perfonnance of the 2005 
Employment Contract and the 2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, which 
, 
would prevent or to any ~xtent restrict enforcement in a court of law of that provision in 
each Employment Contract that if a deposit or amount paid by a prospective purchaser on 
account ofpurcbase be fOrfeited, one~halfthereofmay be retained by Plaintiff' as the 
''Broker'' in each Employment Contract. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: OBJECT as being overbroad and 
vague as to the infonnation Plaintiff is seeking. Defendan.ts further object as the 
DEFENDAN'l'S' ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF lNTERROG.+\TORIES TO 
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Interrogatory seeks the work product of Defendants' attorney. Without waiving this 
objection, see Defendants' Answer, COUlltet'clahn and Third Party Claim. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: To the extent you have not already done so, 
please describe each and every contract, understanding, Ot other circumstence under 
which monies actually deposited or paid after Januaty 1. 2007, by any potential purchaser 
of all or any of the real property that is the subject of the 2005 Employment Contract and 
2007 Employment Contract, or either of them, should not be considered as forfeited as a 
result of such potential purchaser·s not consummating the purchase of such real property. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. U: camcr as this Interrogatory 
continues to assume there was real property that was the subject of the 2005 and 2007 
'~Bmploymeni Contracts" that are attached to Plaintitrs, Complaint as Exhibits nAn and 
"Bn respectively. Those Employment contracts do not comply with Idaho Code § 9-503 
(Idaho's Statute of Frauds) and Idaho Code § 54-2050. Further, the monies in question 
were not forfeited pursuant to the specific terms of the respective Real Estate Purchase' 
and Sale Agreements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please identify and describe all listing 
agreements or other contracts you have entered into with licensed real estate brokers or 
agents since January 28, 2008 to market or sell any real property owned by Defendants in 
Payette County, and/or Washington County, Idaho . 
.ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: None. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please:: describe in as much factual detail as you 
are able. all statements. communications, or other aotions taken by you to terminate, 
revoke, rescind, or renounce any agreement by you to extend the term of the 200S 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS 10 PLAIN'llFF'S FIRST S~T OF INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANTS - Page' 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: See Responses to Requests for 
Admissions. 
..:ei: .:f\1t-, . 
DATED~~daYOf~2008·tti./ t 
DerekA. iea 
Attorney for Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SSt 
That be is one of the Defendants in this action, has read the above Defendant's 
Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants, knows the contents 
thereof and believes the same to be true and correct and in accordance with his desire. . 
DATED this..2L. day of~.L 
fT 
J 2008. 
~~ RiCHARD A. OBERT SON 
Defendant 
Q. ".\-h \ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of~, 2008. 
Qu .. i~> 
NOTARY PY1lUC ~OR AHO 
Residing at: tc;,j \_ .. ~ I.0t __ 
My Commission Expires: ,l , cl.J:JU \ !:> 
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The Court's November 25,2008 Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial required the 
parties to complete all discovery at least 28 days before trial, which remains scheduled to begin 
on June 23,2009. Prior to that Order, Plaintiff had submitted its First Set ofIntenogatories to 
Defendants; these were answered by Defendants on or about July 15, 2008. Plaintiff asked 
Defendants to disclose all their witnesses and, equally important, disclose what those witnesses 
were believed to know about the present controversy (see Affidavit of Mark S. Geston in Supporl; 
of Knipe Land Company and John Knipe's Motion in Limine to Exclude (1) Testimony of Cindy 
Crane, and (2) Testimony Concerning Interests of Cooperating Brokers in a Commission 
("Oeston Aff.") being filed contemporaneously herewith). These Interrogatories further inquired 
as to the full scope of Defendants' defenses and objections to the relief sought by Plaintiff. 
The evidence sought to be excluded by this Motion should have been timely disclosed by 
Defendants in their Answers to Plaintiffs Interrogatories Nos. 1, 10, and 11 (Geston Aff., Ex A), 
but was not. Copies of these Answers to Interrogatories, together with Defendants' verification 
thereof are submitted herewith in confonnity with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3 3(b )(2). 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Cindy Crane Should be Excluded as a Witness. 
Interrogatory No.1 asked Defendants to identify all witnesses they believed to have 
knowledge relevant to the present controversy. as well as their addresses and telephone numbers, 
and that they further describe the substance of the knowledge each such witness was believed to 
have. Defendants' response included a witness named "Cindy Crane-Pacific Corp.," but gave no 
more infonnation as to her address, telephone number, or anything indicating what knowledge 
she might have regarding the present controversy. Defendants' complete Answer, with respect 
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to the purported knowledge of each of all the several witnesses named in the response in addition 
to Ms. Crane, was to the following effect: 
Plaintiff is fully aware of the address and telephone numbers of the 
above persons. Plaintiff is also fully aware of the knowledge each 
person has with regard to this litigation. 
Defendant's (sic) response to this Interrogatory will be 
supplemented as additional witnesses are identified. 
(See Geston Aff., Ex A.) 
Defendants did not supplement their Answer to this Interrogatory, and nothing 
encountered in the course of discovery, to Plaintiffs perception, suggested that Ms. Crane had 
the slightest relevance to the parties' dispute. 
The Court has discretion to exolude witnesses who have not been properly disclosed in 
response to Interrogatories or other discovery. See generally Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 
265,647 P.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1982); Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d 800 (Ct. App. 
1989). In this case, Plaintiff carefully asked Defendants to not only identify all persons with 
relevant knowledge but also to identify what Defendants thought that knowledge was. Rather 
than answering substantively, Defendants erroneously presumed Plaintiffwas already aware of 
what Defendants' witnesses would talk about so there was no need for Defendants to bother with 
answering further. The listing of Ms. Crane as a witness-still without any supplementation to 
the prior Answers to Interrogatories--only days before trial puts Plaintiff at a distinct 
disadvantage that should be remedied by the Court excluding testimony. 
Additionally, Plaintiff has been informally informed by her attorney that Ms. Crane, as an 
employee of the nUclear utility company that had agreed to purchase Defendants' land in late 
2007, will be asked to testify about the terms and conditions of the land purchase contracts that 
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her employer and Defendants entered into. Those purchase a.greements were presented to the 
Court in the course of the parties' various Motions, and there has never been any contention that 
any part of those contracts is in the least bit ambiguous or in need of further explanation, It 
therefore appears that Ms, Crane's testimony. at least as far as such testimony will mOdify, vary, 
or expand on the terms of the purchase agreements, should be foreclosed by the parole evidence 
rule. Alternatively. to the extent of that Ms, Crane's testimony is portrayed as being consistent 
with the plain and unambiguous language of those contracts, it is completely wmecessary and 
redundant since the contracts, by suoh definition, would speak for themselves, 
Plaintiff has already submitted a Motion in Limine, asking the Court to apply the parole 
evidence rule to testimony it anticipates Defendant Richard Robertson will offer to "explain" and 
elaborate on the tenns of the unambiguous purchase agreements they entered into with buyers of 
Defendants' land and with the Employment Contracts Defendants entered into with Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff adopts the authority cited therein and requests the Court to apply it and make it clear 
that Ms. Crane shall not be allowed to vary or restate what those written agreements plainly say, 
B. The Court Should Exclude Testimony Concerning the Interest of Cooperating 
Broker's in a Commission Had a Sale of Defendants' Real Property Been 
Consummated. 
Interrogatories No. 10 and 11 asked Defendants to disclose every statutory, regulatory, or 
factual defect or insufficiency in form, content, execution or performance of the Employment 
Contracts in controversy that would in any way prevent or restrict their enforcement. Defendants 
objected, but nevertheless answered that Plaintiff should refer to Defendants' Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third Party Claim to find such infonnation. The course of discovery and 
argument of Motions, of course, brought out the details of Dei~ndants' defenses to the extent 
they were properly disclosed before the discovery cut-off date. However, Defendants' Trial 
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Brief, submitted and received two days ago, indicates that a hitherto undisclosed claim of 
ambiguity in the Employment Contracts in question will be asserted by Defendants at trial. 
Defendants' brief announced a claim-for what appears to Plaintiff to be the first time-that 
separate obligations which Plaintiff might have to other, third-party "cooperating brokers," 
should limit Plaintiffs recovery herein, or, alternatively, render that recovery so 
"unconscionable" as to require the Court to deny it to Plaintiff entirely. 
More specifically, on pages 5 and 6 of Defendants' Trial Brief, Defendants claim, 
without citation of any evidence, that Plaintiff was committed to share a commission that would 
have resulted from an actual sale of Defendants property to the 2007 purchaser. By Defendants' 
calculation, this means that Plaintiff, after paying off that alleged separate obligation to a third 
party, would have ended up with less money from the sales commission than it seeks herein from 
the forfeiture of that purchaser's earnest money. Defendants argue that this interpretation of the 
Employment Contracts is pemtissible because the specification in the Employment Contracts 
that Plaintiff's share of forfeited monies should not exceed "the commissionu due from 
Defendants is ambiguous and this allows them to introduce parole evidence explaining the 
parties "intent." Furthennore, in the absence of such extrinsic evidence of intent, they are 
entitled to assert the rule interpreting contractual ambiguities against the party drafting the 
document. It is 'Unclear whether Defendants are arguing that Plaintiff's recovery, if there is to be 
one, must be limited to no more than what Plaintiff would net after satisfying its obligations to 
third parties, or lfthey are suggesting that the simple fact that Plaintiff might benefit mOre from 
the application of some terms of the Employment Contract than it would under other terms must 
so offend the Court's conscience that Plaintiff should be denied any recovery at all. 
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The first time this pOint has been raised is in Defendants' Trial Brief~ submitted on June 
16, 2009. Nothing, to Plaintiff s perception, that transpired in the course of its discovery 
suggested such a theory or argument by Defendants. As with the refusal to disclose Ms. Crane's 
relevant knowledae, it is unfair that Defendants should be permitted to constantly generate new 
theories of defense which should have been the subject of conventional discovery. As it stands 
now, Plaintiff does not know what evidence will support this argument, just as it does not know 
what extrinsic evidence should be sought out and presented to the jury to help it detennine the 
parties' true intent. 
For the foregoing reasons, testimony concerning Plaintiffs obligations or agreements 
with third-party "cooperating brokers" or other parties or individuals assisting it in the 
performance of its own obligations Wlder the Employment Contracts in question should be 
excluded in its entirety. 
DATED: June t:t 2009. 
STOEL RlVES LLP 
.k.w«L~---
Mark S. Oeston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COME NOW Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant. by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record Stoel Rives LLP, and hereby move to maintain the monetary amounts offered 
by MidAmerican Nuclear Holding Co., LLC and ultimately agreed upon by and among 
Defendants and MiciAmerican Nuclear Holding Co" LLC, for the purchase of Defendants' real 
property in confidence at the trial of this matter. All references to the proposed and agreed on 
purchase amounts shall be redacted from the exhibits utilized during the trial of the instant 
matter, It is understood, however, that this restriction shall not apply to evidence of earnest 
money, deposits, or money paid by MidAmerican Nuclear Holding Co., LLC on account of its 
purchase of Defendants' real property. 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant request that the jury impaneled in this matter shall be 
instructed by the Court as to the confidentiality of these amounts as set forth on the Proposed 
Instruction attached hereto as Exhibit A. Such instruction shall be given to the jury with only the 
parties, the Judge, and Courtroom personnel present, and that instruction and those portions of 
the record reflecting such instruction shall be deemed confidential and shal1 be kept under seal. 
DATED: June Jj, 2009. 
STOEL RlVES LLP 
Mark Geston 
Je M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/CoW1terdefendant 
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EXHIBIT A 
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PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Several instructions I have previously given you pertain to the amount of money 
MidAmerican Nuclear Holding Company, LLC agreed to pay the Defendants for the purchase of 
their real property. That amount was $6 million. You may also hear evidence in the course of 
this trial concerning an offer of $4.5 million made by MidAmerican Nuclear Holding Co., LLC 
to Defendants to purchase their land before it reached an agreement with the Defendants. Those 
amounts of money are subject to obligations of confidentiality. The parties do not, therefore, 
intended to specifically mention either of those two figures in the course of the testimony they 
may elicit at trial, and they have also blanked out or redacted those figures where they appear in 
documents that may be admitted into evidence. Nevertheless, I am telling you these numbers so 
that you may be fully advised about the circumstances of some of the transactions this trial will 
concern. 
You will notice that I am giving you this instruction in Court with only the parties. you, 
and the regular courtroom personnel present. I am doing this to preserve the confidentiality of 
the infonnation I just shared with you. In this respect, I am also instructing you to keep this 
information confidential. I further instruct you to forever refrain from disclosing or discussing 
either amount of money with any person not presently a juror in this matter or at any time other 
than during your deliberations of this case. 
GIVEN ____ _ 
REFUSED __ ~ 
MODIFIED __ _ 
COVERED __ _ 
OTHER ___ _ 
JUDGE ___ ~ 
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ID Idaho Corporation. 
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Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe. by and through 
their undersigned counsel. respectfully submits to the Court the attached Supplemental Proposed. 
Jury Instructions No. 21 through 22, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure SICa). 
DATED: lune~?2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
. . ~ " . 
. ~,~~ .. ~ ~~
--... 
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PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
In this case the Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, Knipe Land Company and the counter-
Defendant, John Knipe, have asserted waiver by estoppel as an affumative defense to the 
Defendants I Counterc1atm. Those parties have the burden of proof on this affirmative defense. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of the Counter-Defendants for this aftinnative defense and about which I will next 
instruct you, have been proved, then your verdict should be for the Counter-Defendants and 
agatnst the Defendants' Counterclaim. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that any of the propositions has not been proved, then the counter-Defendants have not proved 
their affirmative defense to Defendants' Counterclaim. 
IDJI 6.1 0.4 General contract - affinnative defenses (modified) 
GIVEN =-:-:-' __ _ 
REFUSED 
MODIFIED---
COVERED __ _ 
OTHER ___ _ 
JUDGE ___ _ 
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PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
As I have mentioned., the and Defendants have raised the affinnative defense of waiver 
by estoppel against the Defendants' Counterclaim. This is a legal tenn which means that a party 
is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by reason of the party's own conduct. To 
establish the aff'umative defeIlSe of waiver by estoppel, the Counter-Defendants have the burden 
of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The Defendants represented to the Knipe Land Company and/or John 
Knipe by words or conduct, or by silence when a duty to speak and protest the action of Knipe 
Land Company andlor 10hn Knipe existed, that Defendants were waiVing. excusing. or forgiving 
those Counter-Defendants' breach of contract; and 
2. The COWlter-Defendants relied upon this representation and materially 
changed position in reliance thereon; and 
3. The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and 
4. The change of position was to the Counter-Defendants' detriment. 
If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that the 
Counter-Defendants are not liable to the Defendants on their Counterclaim. If the Counter-
Defendants fail to prove all of the propositions, they have not established the affinnative defense 
of estoppel. 
IDJI 6.22.2 Waiver by estoppel (modified) 
Civil Instructions 
SECTION 6.00 INSTRUCTIONS - CONTRACTS 
GIVEN 
RBFUSE ..... D----
MODIFIED __ _ 
COVERED __ _ 
OTHER ___ _ 




In this case the Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, Knipe Land Company and the counter-
Defendant, Jo1m Knipe, have asserted waiver by estoppel as an affumative defense to the 
Defendants' Counterclaim. Those parties have the burden of proof on this affinnative defense. 
If you fInd {Tom your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
requited of the Counter-Defendants for this affirmative defense and about which I will next 
instruct you, have been proved, then your verdict should be for the Counter-Defendants and 
against the Defendants' Counterclaim. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that any of the propositions has not been proved, then the counter-Defendants have not proved 
their a:ffirmative defense to Defendants' Counterclaim. 
III 008/008 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
As 1 have mentioned, the and Defendants have raised the affinnative defense of waiver 
by estoppel against the Defendants~ Counterclaim. This is a legal tenn which means that a party 
is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by reason of the party's own conduct. Te· 
establish the affinnative defense of waiver by estoppel. the Counter-Defendants have the burden 
of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The Defendants represented to the Knipe Land Company andlor John 
Knipe by words or conduct, or by silence when a duty to speak and protest the action of Knipe 
Land Company and/or John Knipe existed, that Defendants were waiving, excusing, or forgiving 
those Counter-Defendants' breach of contract; and 
2. The Counter-Defendants relied upon this representation and materially 
changed position in reliance thereon; and 
3. The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and 
4. The change of position was to the Counter-Defendants' detriment. 
If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should fmd. that the 
Counter-Defendants are not liable to the Defendants on their Counterclaim. If the Counter-
Defendants fail to prove all of the propositions, they have not established the affirmative defense 
of estoppel. 
